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INTRODUCTION 
A pension scheme is an arrangement whereby an individual contributes 
a regular sum of money to the'State or a private institution during 
his working life and, in return, receives a regular income during 
his retirement years. 
The distinction between State and private pension schemes 
is essential to the whole analysis of pensions since membership of 
the former is compulsory for all workers whilst although it is true 
that, in some cases, the membership of private schemes is voluntary in 
general it is compulsory but the creation of the pension arrangement 
is a voluntary act of the employer. This poses three interesting 
questions: why is there a compulsory scheme organised through the 
State; why might individuals voluntarily join a pension scheme; and 
why would an employer make pension provision for his workers? 
Consider firstly the compulsory state scheme. With the 
slowing down of the population growth rate and the increase in life 
expectancy this century has seen an increase in the proportion of 
population who are elderly from less than 5% at the turn of the, 
century to 12% in 1966. These percentages refer tö an age specific 
definition of the elderly i. e., in the U. K. it is men aged 65 and 
over and women aged 60 and over. In the analysis of, pensions a more 
appropriate definition of elderly would be those unable to work as a 
result of old age. In that the above ages constitute official 
retirement dates in the U. K. the administrative definition can be 
viewed as an average, ability to work varying with the type of 
occupation. 
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Combined with this increase in the proportion of the 
population who can be regarded as elderly the changing industrial 
and occupational environment, in particular the growth of 
mechanisation and specialisation, has made it increasingly difficult 
for the elderly to remain in the workforce. Additionally, in labour 
surplus economies, unemployment will tend to fall disproportionately 
on the lower productivity and geographically less mobile elderly. In 
the absence of a pension scheme those elderly who would-like to work 
will find themselves involuntarily without a source of income, 
assuming that in most cases any capital income is small. 
Apart from those who face involuntary retirement there will 
also be a group of people who, late in their working life, find they 
have developed a preference for retirement - unfortunately in many 
cases financial support will not be available to facilitate this 
retirement. - 
Having explained the existence of a class of elderly non- 
workers in society without financial provision for retirement it 
then has to be asked why there is an absence of a pension arrangement. 
Perhaps the most important reason is that individuals are pyopic in 
that they foresee neither the possibility of enforced retirement, as 
a result of unemployment or illness, nor a preference for a period 
of retirement at the end of the working life. As a result of this 
they have neither saved explicitly nor made some intergenerational 
arrangement of the type suggested by a Hobbes-Rousseau social contract 
as discussed in Samuelson (52). Alternatively, the explanation could--lie 
in the structure of the capital market, imperfections in which make it 
difficult; -to arrangeesuitable long term=contracts. 
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The absence of a pension arrangement implies that, for 
individuals who are involuntarily retired, the burden of their 
financial support has to fall on somebody. For a long time this was 
regarded as the responsibility of children but just as the work 
prospects for the elderly have been changing so has family life, in 
terms of a shift away from children's obligation towards their 
parents. As regards those who would like to retire bpt cannot afford 
to, they probably realise, albeit too late, the advantages of pension 
provision and would have liked a compulsory arrangement. To make 
available cover for these contingencies has been seen as a social 
responsibility and therefore the role of the State. 
Prior to 1925 Government policy in the U. K. did not. 
distinguish between the above reasons for intervention - pensions 
were integrated into the National Assistance Scheme, being paid out 
of general tax revenue and subject to a means test. In 1925 it was 
decided that groups of people who were likely to be future 
recipients of state pensions ought to contribute towards them 
during their working lives - thus the Contributory Pensions Act of 
that year incorporated pension provision into the system of social 
insurance that had been in operation since 1911. The principle. 
employed was that of a flat rate contribution in return for a flat 
rate benefit. The individual contribution Sias augmented by employer 
and Exchequer contributions -a fund was set up and the Exchequer 
contribution varied dcpording to whether the fund made a profit or 
loss from year to year. Endorsement of this arrangement was contained 
in the Beveridge Report1, where it was argued that the insurance 
principle should guarantee a basic income for subsistence whilst 
provision for a higher standard would be the responsibility of the 
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individual and require voluntary insurance. The basic scheme was to 
be made available to all the workforce and coverage was thus 
extended in 1946. Nevertheless National Assistance still had a 
supporting role to play since most people who retired between 1946 
and 1966 had not built up full pension rights, which were based on 
20 years' membership, whilst others had not satisfied the full 
entitlement conditions, in that they had breaks in their payments. 
Since then there have been only two major pension changes2. 
In 1961 a graduated scheme3 was introduced which would operate 
alongside the flat rate scheme - in addition to the flat rate 
constributions, one which was earnings related was payable in return 
for which individuals received a contribution related pension as 
well as that guaranteed them under the flat rate scheme. The aim of 
the scheme was threefold. The Exchequer contribution to the flat rate 
scheme was growing and it was thought that relating benefits to 
contributions would reverse this trend. Private earnings related 
schemes were also available to many people and the graduated 
scheme offered similar arrangements to those not covered privately. 
It was also hoped that the scheme would encourage the growth of 
private schemes since employers who offered schemes that satisfied 
certain requirements could 'contract out' of the graduated scheme 
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meaning that they had the option of withdrawing from the scheme. 
This scheme was relatively short--,, lived and was discontinued, 
along with the flat rate scheme in 19755q when a scheme based on 
proportional contributions and earnings related benefits was 
introduced. Such a scheme was the only logical choice given that 
the benefits from the flat rate scheme had continually fallen below 
the National Assistance/Supplementary Benefit subsistence levels 
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whilst under all assumptions concerning the final incidence of 
employers' contributions, the contribution system was regressive. 
In addition, Exchequer contributions were continuing to rise. 
Turning now to the consideration of private pension 
schemes, the Beveridge Report, as mentioned above, had argued that 
individuals who required relatively high levels of retirement 
income and/or a certain degree of financial independence would have 
to make their own pension arrangements. This would also be the case 
if a flexible retirement date was desired. But neither of these is 
the most important reason individuals will voluntarily make pension 
provision. Its most important role is that it constitutes a hedge 
against unanticipated longevity. It is quite clear that the major 
problem in planning to live off accumulated savings during 
retirement is that when the date of death is uncertain it is 
difficult to determine the rate at which wealth ought to be 
consumed. A pension arrangement alleviates the consequences of an 
incorrect plan. 
It has already been mentioned that pension schemes are 
often initiated by employers. In some cases these are non contributory: 
in most cases they are contributory and participation is compulsory. 
This type of arrangement has little to do with the uncertain length 
of life of employees and it seems unlikely that the employer is so 
benignantt as to be concerned with the retirement welfare of his 
employees. It is not then surprising that employers themselves stand 
to gain from setting up a pension scheme. If pension claims are not 
transferable between occupations then an employer can maintain a 
fairly stable labour force and not incur costs of labour turnover 
(i. e. training costs). If a scheme encourages early retirement then 
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the employer can gain since he can plan an orderly pattern of 
recruitment and training and possibly reap efficiency gains as a 
result of replacing older workers by higher productivity younger 
workers. Provision of a pension-scheme has also proved an important 
collective bargaining weapon and is a relatively cheap concession 
when employer contributions can be passed on in wages and prices as 
well as there existing the possibility of contracting out of the 
graduated scheme. 
As well as individual and employer benefits from private 
pension schemes another beneficiary is the Government. This is the 
result of the financial burden of ageing being shifted from the 
Government to individuals and employers. This is explained by the 
reduced dependence on State pensions and the transfer of adminis- 
tration costs as a result of contracting out. 
Although private schemes have existed in the public sector 
since the middle of the last century, it is only since the First 
World War that continuous growth has taken place. At the end of the 
inter-war period there were 4 million employees covered by public 
sector pension schemes. This figure has remained constant ever since. 
Between 1936 and 1971 the coverage of non public sector private 
schemes rose from 1.6 million to 7.0 million. workers. 
From the individual point of view there are two types of 
pension arrangement available. Formula plans refer to schemes where, 
although savings are generated, the pension paid is not determined 
by savings alone, if at all. Typical'of these types of scheme are 
flat rate schemes where the contribution/benefit formula is as with 
the state scheme - this arrangement is popular with works schemes, 
57% of works members having such a pension in 1971. Amongst staff 
7 
members the most popular type of arrangement, enjoyed by some 76%, is 
a terminal salary scheme where the pension is related to salary at 
retirement. The other major type of scheme is an average salary scheme 
in which case the pension is a function of average lifetime earnings, 
or the latter part thereof. About 10% of'staff and works members are 
in such a scheme. In the previous two schemes the pension contributions 
are a fixed proportion of salary or earnings, whilst employers 
contribute a sum related to individual employee contributions. 
Savings plans involve capital accumulation in some form by or on 
behalf of the individual. The pension benefit is a function of 
accumulated savings and any interest payments. Such a scheme will be 
referred to as a money purchase scheme. Approximately 10% of staff 
and works members contribute to this type of scheme. 
Schemes can be capital reserve or pay-as-you-go. Capital 
reserve schemes operate on the basic principle of risk pooling, losses 
being incurred on individuals whose life span is longer than average 
whilst gains are made on those who the relatively early. The average 
contributor just covers the cost of his pension after allowance is 
made for employers contributions and interest earned on contributions. 
These schemes can themselves be divided into those which are funded 
and those that are insured. The difference between the two is simply 
the distinction between implicit and explicit insurance. A funded 
scheme relies on mutual insurance as a result of risk pooling whilst 
an insured scheme involves payments based explicitly on life 
contingencies. One purchases a life insurance policy which on 
retirement is converted to an annuity. 
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A pay-as-you-go arrangement is one where the pension is paid 
directly out of current resources including employee and employer 
contributions. The scheme has no investment income as there are 
neither interest payments on a fund nor insurance company profits. 
Another important factor, which affects the attractiveness 
of a scheme from the employer's point of view, is the distinction 
between vested and unvested rights. A scheme is vested in a member 
when he becomes absolutely entitled to a future pension or cash 
refund of his contributions. Vested rights when first included in 
schemes often had age and loyalty restrictions attached to them. More 
recently encouragement towards unconditional vested rights hase met 
with partial success although examples of this form of industrial 
feudalism are still not unknown. 
This has been only a brief review of inptftuti6nglrpension 
arrangements in as much as they are relevant to the discussion of the 
economic aspects of pensions to follow. Indeednpenaionsmra}se many 
interesting, although underinvestigated, questions from an economic 
standpoint. The relationship between pensions and the distribution 
of wealth has only been investigated by Atkinson (8))(9)) although 
interest should be increased in the aftermath of the Diamond Report 
(16). The role of pension funds in a growing economy, in particular 
the optimal combinations of funded and pay-as-you-go schemes, has 
recently been analysed by Praag and Poeth (48). How the State ought 
to decide the appropriate intergenerational redistribution rule in 
designing a social security pension scheme has been discussed in 
Asimokopulous and Weldon (4)). Other problems which have received 
some although not excessive attention are the flexibility of pension 
funds in creating credit and the effect of pension schemes on labour 
mobility. 
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In the opinion of the author, perhaps the most interesting 
question is the relationship between pension savings and other forms 
of personal capital accumulation. Although this aspect has been 
investigated in detail for the U. S. no corresponding work has been 
attempted for the U. K. In the first chapter of this thesis existing 
work in this area will be reviewed - the remaining chapters will 
contain a theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationship 
in the U. K. 
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NOTES 
1. Cmnd. 6404 (1942). 'Social Security and Allied Services'. 
2. Others were prepared. In particular two Labour party proposals 
contained in Labour Party (1957), 'National Superannuation' and 
Cmnd. 3883 (1969), 'National Superannuation and Social Insurance' 
were subject to much detailed discussion (see Atkinson (5) (6), 
Black (12) and Prest (49)). 
3. Cmnd. 538 (1958), 'Provision for Old Age'. t 
4. The conditions of and issues relating to contracting out are 
discussed in Lynes (42). 
5. Cmnd. 5713 (1974), 'Better Pensions'. 
CHAPTER ONE 
PENSIONS AND PERSONAL SAVINGS: 
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Pension saving is one of many possible methods of personal capital 
accumulation but, for the most part, it-distinguishes itself from the 
alternatives by being automatic and passive. Only individuals who 
voluntarily join a pension scheme, which will normally be of the 
money purchase variety, can be said to be involved in active saving. 
Although it is unlikely that the behaviour within other financial 
intermediaries will affect the level of pension saving this does 
not imply that pension saving will not alter the rate of other types 
of saving 
l. 
A priori the effect of pension savings on other alternatives 
is difficult to determine since there exist reasons why savings could 
either increase or decrease. Savings might increase if participation 
in a pension scheme induces early retirement - any retirement saving 
then has to be spread over a longer period and an individual's 
reaction to this might be to intensify his savings effort. On the 
other hand, if savings were left unaltered, participation in a pension 
scheme would involve a fall in consumption - individuals might be 
more interested in maintaining the level of consumption and 
substitute pension saving for other forms of personal savings. The 
net outcome of these 'induced retirement' and 'savings replacement' 
effectsq in the absence of further information relating to the 
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determinants of individual behaviour, is clearly ambiguous2. It may 
be possible to say a little more if attention is focussed on the 
effects on total savings including retirement savings. The 
combination of the two effects mentioned above will generally result 
in an increase in total savings since the substitution effect leaves 
the level of savings constant, except in the case of state schemes 
where the pension contributions are not necessarily saved. 
This introduction has served to illustrate how pension plans 
might affect savings although so far little has been learnt about 
the sign of the effect and nothing about its magnitude. A number of 
empirical studies have tackled this problem and the purpose of this 
chapter is to report their results,. in particular those conducted 
in the U. S. 
Given the findings of Kuznets (37), Modigliani and Brumberg 
(46), and Goldsmith (25) concerning the long run constancy of the 
savings ratio one would expect that a pension asset would be a 
substitute for other assets in the individual's portfolio. Indeed 
a general study of savings behaviour undertaken by Friend and Jones 
(24), using BLS-Wharton data for the U. S., found that in the case of 
private pensions, in common with other forms of contractual savings, 
this was the position although the substitution was far from perfect. 
Evidence relating specifically to the' relationship between private 
pension schemes and personal savings in the U. S. is contained in 
studies by Cagan (15) and Katona (35), whilst the role of social 
security, both in the U. S. and internationally, is examined by 
Feldstein (19)(20). It is this research which is to be reported 
in detail., 
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1.2 CAGAN 
Cagan, on behalf of the NBER Pension Group, investigated the savings 
behaviour of an 11% sample (11513) of members of the U. S. Consumers 
Union for the year 1958-9. The Consumers Union has a membership with 
a higher than average mean income and level of educational attainment. 
Cagan first tested the substitution hypothesis between 
discretionary savings and pension savings and found that for those 
covered by pension plans their average pension saving ratio was 2.8% 
as was t e-ir average discretionary ratio3. For those not covered the 
average savings ratio was 2.1%. Although it is clear that-pension 
savings and other forms of discretionary savings do not appear to be 
substitutes the Friend and Jones result, that discretionary savings 
and other forms of contractual savings were substitutes, was confirmed. 
As regards the relationship between pension and other forms of 
contractual savings individuals with pension plans had-average 
contractual savings ratios of 5.9% whilst for those not covered the 
average was 5.7%. 
In the U. S. social security coverage is not universal and 
if some households take anticipated social security benefits into 
account in making retirement plans this could affect their behaviour. 
Cagan therefore presented estimates of the average savings ratios of 
households with and without social security coverage but all of whom 
had a private pension. The average contractual savings ratio was 5.9% 
for both groups whilst the average pension savings ratio was 3.7% 
for those with social security and 2.6% for those without. This 
latter group had a higher average discretionary savings ratio of 3.1% 
as opposed to 1.7%. It would appear that the evidence suggests that 
iLý 
being covered by social security as well as a private pension 
increases the degree of complementarity. 
Cagan had a number of reservations about this analysis. 
Firstly it could be that those covered by private pensions and social 
security save more because they have higher incomes and are older. 
To examine the extent of these variabilities the savings ratios of 
arbitrarily chosen sub-samples divided according to age and income 
were calculated and on the basis of these results the full sample 
estimates were adjusted. It was found that the 'pension effect' did 
not vary with either age or income, except in the case of the 
relatively small extreme income classes, although the range of error 
was larger. Secondly, it might be that the savings ratio is 
positively correlated with occupation and educational attainment. 
Although the data confirmed this it was assumed that as income, 
occupation and educational attainment are in general highly 
correlated the above results for income variability probably hold 
in these cases. Lastly it might be that the causation runs the opposite 
way to that assumed and individuals with high savings ratios choose 
occupations offering pension coverage. The results already cited 
suggest that this is not the case - if jobs with pension plans are 
more accessible to younger workers, which is likely to be the case, 
then one would expect the ! pension effect' to be age specific, which 
it is not. 
An attempt was made to test whether there were any 
extraneous differences between covered and non-covered groups by 
inferring quasi-life cycle savings ratios from the cross-section data. 
The survey contained information as to how long people had been 
covered by private pensions and given their age it was then possible 
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to work out how long they were not covered if an assumption was made 
about the age of entry into the workforce. If this was taken ) to be 
22 then the wealth of a person aged A would be given by 
i=P-1 j=A 
WA = W22 +E si +Es 
i=23 j=P 
(1.2.1) 
where s is annual savings (discretionary plus contractual) and P is 
the age at which an individual joined the private scheme. The 
following regression equation has then estimated 
TIJ 
++ßö«3ii ß+ß1((A-{ýP-ýý))}ý (1.2.2) Y=I 
il k 
where Si and Si are the average savings ratios while not covered 
and covered by a private pension respectively. The regression 
estimates4 revealed that for those covered the average savings ratio 
rose from 6.2% to 8.2% on entering a pension scheme. For those not 
covered by the average savings ratio was 6.3%. This analysis 
provided confirmation of the earlier results in qualitative terms. 
The fact that-the latter ratios were all higher probably reflects 
the different estimation procedure used. 
. Cagan explained his results in terms of a recognition effect - 
he argued that on joining a private pension scheme an individual is 
made aware that a 'reasonable' income is attainable during the 
retirement years. The way to achieve this is through additional 
savings, 
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1.3 KATONA 
Katona surveyed a cross-section of the continental U. S. population 
over 1962-3 - he confined his analysis to 1853 households in a 
'crucial' group which were complete families with a head aged 35-65 
and earning at least $3000 per annum. Young persons were excluded 
since they would not have formulated specific retirement expectations 
whilst low income families were excluded owing to their assumed 
lack of discretion over consumption/saving decisions. Although 
Katona cöncerned himself with a number of aspects of the relationship 
between retirement, pension plans and income only those connected with 
the relationship between the participation in a private pension plan 
and savings behaviour will be reported. 
Less than half of the crucial group were covered by a 
private pension plan and Katona compared the savings ratios of this 
group with those not covered. It was found that 7% of those not 
covered and 14% of those covered had savings ratios greater than or 
equal'to 10%. For the savings ratios 5-9% and-2-4% the corresponding 
percentages were 6%/9% and 6%/12% respectively. These results 
support those of Cagan. 
'Katona also performed a series of regressions to determine 
the relative significance of pension plan participation in explaining 
savings. The method was to regress savings - defined in the following 
three ways; savings ratio greater than 5%, those who had saved in 
the last 24 months (savings behaviour)-and the proportion of an 
anticipated income increase saved (attitudinal behaviour) ý on age, 
income and a series of retirement variables each added successively 
into the equation. Retirement was represented by pension plan participation 
(yes/no dummy variable), ratios of expected retirement income to current 
income and expected retirement needs (high/low dummy variables and 
1ý 
a subjective estimate of-the adequacy of expected retirement 
income (enough/not enough dummy variable). Analysis of t values 
revealed that pension plan participation explained savings 
consistently better than other retirement variables except in the 
case of savings behaviour where the subjective estimate of the 
adequacy of retirement income came out best. It also proved more " 
significant than age and compared favourably with income. As with 
the Cagan regressions, these confirmed that the relationship 
between savings and pension plan participation was one of 
complementarity. 
Katona explained his findings in terms of a goal gradient 
hypothesis arguing that as an individual nears his aspiration level, 
which in this case will be a desired level of retirement income, his 
savings effort is intensified. 
1.4 FELDSTEIN 
Feldstein (19) examined the effect of the growth of social 
security pensions on aggregate savings in the U. S. He argued that if 
the combination of social security taxes and benefits has no income 
effect and if the pattern of retirement and income is fixed a social 
security programme will reduce savings by just enough to leave 
consumption during retirement unchanged. This he called the savings 
replacement effect. Operating in the opposite direction will be an 
induced retirement effect. This comes about because in the case of 
those who, in the absence of social security5, would have worked 
after the official retirement date there is now an incentive to 
reduce the supply of labour. If younger workers correctly anticipate 
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this reduction in their working lives then they will increase their 
savings. The net outcome of these two effects will be ambiguous. 
This possibility, which is one that is also mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, is arrived at not because of a 
recognition or goal gradient effect but because of the endogeneity 
of the retirement decision. Feldstein demonstrated this possibility 
theoretically by a simple extension of the two period life cycle 
model6. 
Consider the case of an individual who, in the absence of 
social security would retire at the official retirement age. In 
Figure 1.4.1 his first period earnings are YO - he would choose 
equilibrium A, consuming C0 and saving (Y0 - Co). Second period 
consumption would be (l+r)(Y0- CO), the interest factor, (l+r), being 
given by the slope of the budget line tangential to I. Introducing 
the social security pension a tax ß3''impY-iýYimpoVlý and benefits O 0' Oo 
in the second period are (1+r)(Y - Yl). The individual's budget OO 
line is not altered and he maintains equilibrium A- the individual 
reduces savings by exactly (Y0 - YO). 
This result can be compared with that for the case where, 
in the absence of social security, the individual would continue to 
work after the official retirement date. In Figure 1.4.2 the 
individuals initial position is given by C with the same first 
period earnings Y0 and positive second period earnings. Equilibrium 
would be at B with consumption C. in the first period and (1+r) 
(YC - CO, )+ Yl in the second period. If the introduction of the 
social security induces retirement at the official date then the 
initial ecpo tiänat-will shift to a point such as D with first period 
earnings falling by the amount of the tax (YQ - Yý) and lower second 
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period income as earnings are not fully replaced by social security. 
Starting from initial position D the individual's equilibrium is at 
A- this choice implies a reduction in savings since (Y0 - Cý) > 
(Y0 - C0). It is quite clear though that a different expansion path 
of consumption could yield (Y0 - CÖ) < (YÖ - C0). Figure 1.4.3 is 
constructed to demonstrate such a result. 
To assess the effect empirically Feldstein estimated the 
Modigliani-Brumberg-Ando life cycle consumption function with an 
additional term, the discounted present value of anticipated pension 
benefits weighted by survival probabilities, included. This was called 
social security wealth and was defined in both gross (excluding 
liabilities) and net (including liabilities) terms. It was evaluated 
on the assumption that individuals would not work beyond the official 
retirement date and reflects, therefore, both the savings replacement 
and induced retirement effects. For the period 1929-71 (excluding 
1941.6), using both definitions of social security wealth, 
discounting future pension income at both 1% and 5% and considering 
a number of exact specifications of the consumption function it has 
found that the marginal propensity to consume out of social security 
wealth was both larger and more significant than that out of ordinary 
wealth. It took significant values of between . 010 and . 0757 - the 
' higher marginal propensities corresponded to the net definitions of 
social security wealth but changing the definition did not affect 
the coefficients of the other income and wealth variables. To test 
the possibility that the significant coefficient on social security 
wealth variable was only a reflection of the shift in consumption 
behaviour in moving from the pre- to the post-war period the 
consumption functions were re-estimated for the period 1947-71. 
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Although the coefficients on social security wealth were much the same, 
ranging from . 
014 to . 
0358, and Feldstein argued that they supported 
the conclusion that social security depressed the level of personal 
savings, it has to be added that these coefficients were statistically 
insignificant. 
Turning now to the implications of this study, a marginal 
propensity to consume personal disposable income of . 650 and that to 
consume social security wealth of . 0219 imply that in 1971 social 
security halved the rate of personal saving10. Feldstein felt that 
this was not a surprising result since for many low and middle 
income families the savings replacement effect would be large whilst 
the induced retirement effect was likely to be relatively small. The 
evidence available appeared to confirm this since before the 
introduction of social security about 45% of men over 65 were retired 
whilst in 1965 the figure had only risen to 73%. Those who had not 
retired would typically be workers on lower incomes. 
In a second paper, Fä1Hs m (20) presented an international 
cross-section analysis of the relationship. He argued that in a 
stationary economy the standard life cycle model implies that there 
will be no net aggregate savings and there will exist an equilibrium 
aggregate ratio of wealth to income which is a"function of the 
interest rate, the rate of discount and the life cycle earnings 
profile. A growing economy on the other hand will exhibit positive 
net aggregate savings and require continuing increases in-wealth to 
maintain the equilibrium ratio of wealth to income. If there is a 
system of social security then the adjustment of wealth to maintain 
this equilibrium will have to take account of wealth embodied in 
social security pensions. Specifically if the maintenance of the 
-j'4- 
wealth income ratio requires an increase in wealth then savings has 
to increase but if social security benefits increase this can be 
substituted for an equal amount of private savings. This wealth 
replacement effect can be seen to be formally identical to the 
savings replacement effect. Social security also reduces the number 
of older workers which implies an increase in the equilibrium 
wealth to income ratio and private savings has to increase. This is 
the induced retirement effect. 
In a situation of steady state growth, -where the savings 
ratio is approximately proportional to the rate of growth of income 
11 
this rhrpbthesisp could be tested by estimating a savings function 
of the form 
X= 
(a + B0 
B+ 
ý1 LPA) G (1.4.1) 
where S is per capita savings, Y per capita income, B is the average 
social security pension, LPA the labour force participation of the 
aged and G the rate of growth of national income. The bracketed term, 
which contains both the wealth replacement and induced retirement 
effects reflects the equilibrium ratio of wealth to income. When 
dealing with cross-section data the above steady state specification 
has to be modified since the data will reflect disequilibrium 
situations. This was achieved by adopting a linear form of the 
equation with G as a'linearly related independent variable and 
introducing further-variables used byýModigliani (45) in his inter- 
national cross-section test of the life cycle hypothesis, in 
particular the ratio of minor dependants to working population (non- 
aged) and the ratio of old individuals to working population (non-aged) 
ýs 
and life expectancy at the official retirement date. In addition 
variables representing the proportion of the aged receiving pensions 
and the average benefit per aged person with and without an earnings 
test were included in some of the estimated equations. All ratios 
were included in percentage terms. 
The savings functions were estimated12 by two stage least 
squares with labour force participation of the aged endogenous 7-1 
the results confirmed that social security pensions had considerable 
impact on personal savings. The results suggested that the savings 
ratio was increasing in the rate of growth of income and life 
expectancy at retirement whilst being negatively related to the 
labour force participation of the aged. It was also found to be 
decreasing in both the level of social security benefits and coverage13. 
These findings accord with the discussion of the theory. 
To discover the net impact on savings Feldstein estimated a 
series of equations with the labour force participation of the aged 
as the dependent variable and a number of these included in the 
previous regressions as dependent variables. The most interesting 
result was that labour force participation was revealed to be a 
decreasing function of both the level of social security pension 
benefits and the ratio of pension recipients to the total population 
over the official retirement age14. Combining estimated equations 
relating to the determination of the savings ratio and the labour 
force participation of the aged suggested that the net impact of the 
wealth replacement and induced retirement effects was to reduce 
l5. 
savings 
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1.5 CONCLUSION 
It has been shown in this review that the effect of pension scheme 
participation on personal savings is both theoretically and 
empirically ambiguous. Using cross section data for the U. S. both 
Cagan and Katona found that the relationship between personal 
savings and pension plan participation was one of complementarity. 
In a development context this result was confirmed by Reviglio (51). 
This positive net effect on savings was explained by a recognition 
or goal gradient hypothesis. Feldstein (19)(20) argued that this 
result could be arrived at without resorting to these hypotheses: 
an induced retirement effect explains the same outcome. His U. S. 
time series and international cross section empirical analyses 
suggested that the net impact on savings was negative. If there was 
an induced retirement effect it was outweighed by a savings 
replacement effect. The overall relationship was therefore one of 
substitutability. This result has also been arrived at in the 
Canadian context by Schoeplein (53). 
So far no analysis of this relationship has been undertaken 
for the U. K. - this will be the aim of this thesis. Specifically it 
will attempt to 
i) extend Feldstein's two period life cycle model to a 
multi-period analysis. A continuous time formulation will be used. 
ii) include both state and private pensions in the 
theoretical and empirical analysis. 
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NOTES 
1. This will now be called simply savings except where this proves 
grammatically clumsy. In such cases the nature of saving will 
be made explicit. 
2. From what has been said this is clearly the only conclusion but 
one might argue that it is unlikely that increases in savings 
due to_induced retirement will ever outweigh the reduction 
necessary to compensate for lower disposable income. The 
feasibility of such an outcome is discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. 
3. Excluding those with extreme savings ratios. 
4. The regressions ignored changes in savings ratios with age and 
used current income to deflate wealth, therefore understating 
the ratio W/Y as one moves back through time. 
5. Social security always means the social security pension scheme. 
6. Feldstein also presents his model in mathematical form. An 
abbreviated version of this model is presented in the Appendix 
to this chapter. 
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7. Using a net rate of discount of 1%, typical results were 
Ct = 228 + . 530 Yt + . 120 Yt_l +. 356 REt +. 
014 Wt_1 +. 021 SSW (gross) 
(31) (. 047) (. 035) (. 074) (. 004) (. 006) 
SSR = 3618 DW = 1.82 
Ct = 218 + . 528 Yt + . 137 Yt_1 +. 376 REt +. 013 Wt-1 +. 
032 SSW (net) 
(27) (. 047) (. 034) (. 073) (. 004) (. 009) 
SSR = 3548 DW = 1.85 
There are results for regressions using per capita values of all 
variables at constant prices. Ct is consumer's expenditure, Yd 
personal disposable income, REt corporate retained earnings, Wt_1 
net wealth and SSW social security wealth'. The inclusion of the 
term Yti reflects expected income. The justification for including 
REt is that it proved a significant determinant of consumption in 
testing the capital income hypothesis (see Feldstein and Fane 
(22)). This hypothesis is considered in some detail in Section I 
of Chapter 4. 
8. Corresponding to previous results one has 
Ct = 193 + . 535 Yt + . 139 Yt_1 +. 4 14 REt + . 015 Wt_l + . 014 SSW 
(gross) 
(159)(. 097) (. 097) (. 163) (. 009) (. 030) 
SSR = 3086 DW = 1.63 
Ct =232 +. 535 Yt +. 119 Yt_1 +. 349 REt +. 014 Wt_1+ . 035 SSW (net) 
(104)(. 084) (. 085) (. 170) (. 007) (. 030) 
SSR = 2926 DW = 1.78 
9. See note 7 above. 
ý9 
10. The decrease consists of two components. Firstly savings is lost 
due to the fact that social security contributions reduce 
disposable income - this loss is equal to (1 - . 650)(1 -. the 
rate of income tax) X aggregate contributions. Secondly there is 
a positive marginal propensity to consume out of social security 
wealth which implies a reduction in savings of . 021 X social 
security wealth. 
11. The proportionality is only approximate because a growing 
population will change the age structure which implies a different 
equilibrium ratio of wealth to income. 
12. The data used was a sub-sample of that used by Modigliani - 
although it consisted of only 15 of his 36 countries it included 
62% of the total sample by numbers and 97% of those in the 
developed countries. 
13. The significant coefficients on the labour force participation 
of the aged varied between -. 24 and -. 38, those on benefits per 
retired pension between -. 101 and -. 108, and those on benefits 
per elderly person between -. 077 and -. 104. On the rate of growth 
they varied between 1.17 and 1.69 and on life expectancy between 
1.60 and 2.20. The effect of coverage was also negative, the 
coefficient varying between -. 056 and -. 083. 
14. The significant coefficients on the level of benefits vary 
between -. 25 and -. 37 and on coverage between -. 1 and -. 2. 
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15. Feldstein considered the effect of a 25% difference in the 
benefit level and coverage. The net effect consists of a pure 
wealth replacement effect, which if the coefficient on benefits 
per aged person is -. 108 implies a reduction in savings of 2.7%, 
and an induced retirement effect, which if the relevant 
coefficient is -. 25 implies an increase on the savings rate of 
1.49%. The net effect is a decrease in savings of 1.21%. A 
similar calculation for coverage yielded a net decrease in 
savings of 1.48%. 
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APPENDIX 1 
F, -'-iüýTHE FELDSTEIN MODEL ="=ý ý1 
For purposes of comparison with results in the next chapter this 
Appendix contains the mathematical version of Feldstein's model for 
the case where an individual is free to choose how much work he does 
in the second period, when he is entitled to a pension. 
The individual has a two period utility function 
U=u (Co, £0)+v (C1, Z1) (1. A. 1. ) 
Denoting labour income in each period, i, (1-2i) we can write 
c0 = (1-t)(1-R0) -S (1. A. 2. ) 
where t is the rate of social security tax, s denotes savings, and 
cl = (1+r) s+ (1-t-u) (1-j, 1) +b 
(l . A. 3. ) 
where r is the rate of interest, u is the earnings test rate of tax 
and b is pension income. 
Assuming that X1 is fixed the first order conditions for 
utility maximisation are 
Was = -u1 + v1(1+r) =0 (1. A. 4. ) 
Wax, = -v1(1-t-u) + v2 
32 
Totally differentiating these equations and employing the assumption 
that the pension scheme operates according to the constraint 
b= (1+r) t(1-RD) + (t+u) (1-t 1) 
(1. A. 6. ) 
Yields two equations for ds and dt2 from which dt can be eliminated. 
These equations are given by 
ds 
A =adu+bdb 
dJC2 
where 
(u11 + (1+r)2 v11) 
A= 
(1+r)(v12 - v11) 
(1+r)(v12 - v11) 
(v11 + v22 - 2v12) 
(1. A. 7. ) 
ý(1+r) 
a 
(1-L0)+(1-R1), -1(1-R0) (1-11) (u11 + (1+r) 
2 
v11ý 
-ý(1+r) (1-k0)+(1-k 1))-1(1+r) (1-LO) 
(vl+(v11-v12) (1-! Cl)) 
E(1+r) (1-Rý)+(1-kl) -1(1-IC0) (u11+(1+r)2v11) 
b= 
L(1+r) (1-R0)+(1-9,1))-'(v1-(l+r) (1-20). (v11-v12) 
which can be solved to obtain 
JAI IS 
= 
{(l+r) 
(l_ 
i))^1(l. ko) 
[TA! 
(1-! ßl)-(l+r)2(vll-v12)vi (1. A. 8. ) 
ýAI 
_ -((1+r) (1-RO)+(1-9 )ýl(IAI (1-ko)+(1+r) (v11-°12)°11 (1. A. 9. ) 
(1. A. 1O. ) 
IAI 
1- (1+r) (1-2,0 )+(1-k1 )J -1 (1+r) (1-R0 ) {vii+(1+r) 2v11 J vl au-- "`2 1 
ý[uj1+(1+r)2 a 
IA! 
iý 
1--1 (1+r) (1-L0)+(1-lC1) -1 
11 vl 
(1. A. 11. ) 
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The second order conditions for utility maximisation imply that 
JAI> 0 
and 
[u11+(1+r)2v11J<o. 
Thus from (l. A. 10. ) and (l. A. ll) 
dP1/du <0 0 
d&1/db <00 
(1. A. 12. ) 
(1. A. 13. ) 
Increases in the rate of tax on second period earnings as a result 
of the earning rule and the pension make second period leisure 
relatively attractive. If it is assumed that v 11-v 12 
<0 then from 
(1. A. 8. ) 
ds/du >00 (1. A. 14. ) 
which is understandable since the earnings test reduces second 
period labour income. Unfortunately this assumption does not enable 
ds/db to be signed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A LIFE CYCLE MODEL OF ACCUMULATION AND RETIREMENT 
BEHAVIOUR INCORPORATING A STATE PENSION SCHEME 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of-this chapter is to extend Feldstein's two period life 
cycle model of accumulation and retirement behaviour to a multiperiod 
analysis. The features of the U. S. social security retirement plan 
included in his analysis will be replaced by those of the flat rate 
state pension scheme as it has operated in the U. K. until fairly 
recently. 
In section 2.2 a simple version of the two period model 
will be reviewed. This will then be extended employing a continuous 
time formulation and a life cycle accumulation/consumption plan will 
be derived. 
Section 2.3 will see the incorporation of the state pension 
scheme into the model. The optimall retirement date will be considered. 
The results of sections 2.2 and 2.3 will be combined in 
section 2.4 when the effect of changes in pension contributions and 
benefits on retirement behaviour and lifecycle savings is analysed. 
In section 2.4 certain modifications of the analysis are 
presented. 
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2.2 THE OPTIMUM CONSUMPTION PLAN 
In the simplest version of the life cycle model of consumer behaviour 
1 
it is assumed that 
A. 1. the individual knows all price and income variables 
with certainty 
A. 2. the individual knows how long he will live 
A. 3. the individual neither receives nor desires to leave 
any bequest 
A. 4. there is a perfect capital market. 
In the two period model the individual's problem is to 
choose a consumption vector (co, c1) to maximise his lifetime utility 
subject to a budget constraint determined by his income in each period. 
Assume the utility function to be of the form 
U= u(c0) + u(c1) (1/l+6) (2.2.1. ) 
where u is the same one period utility function with the properties 
u'( )>O, u"( )<O. d is the pure or subjective rate of time preference. 
If it is assumed that there are no second period earnings then (2.2.1. ) 
is maximised subject to the constraint that 
yo - Co - c1 (1/l+r) =0 (2.2.2. ) 
where r is the market rate of interest, which is used to discount 
future income and consumption. 
From the first order conditions for a maximum 
84/öc0 = u'(c0) -A=O (2.2.3. ) 
aujaýl = u'(clýti/i+aý - aci/i+rý =o (2.2.4. ) 
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where 11 is the appropriate Lagrangian and A the Lagrange multiplier, 
it can be shown that 
u'(c1)/u'(c0) = (1+6)/(l+r) (2.2.5. ) 
which implies that if 
(a) r>d then c1>c0 
(b) r=d then c1 c0 
(c) r<d then cl<c0 
Diagrammatically these results are summarised in Figure 2.2.1. 
This model is easily extended to the multiperiod case where 
the individual is assumed to live for L years. The first order 
condition in each period will be 
U, (ci) X(1/1+r)1 =0 (i = 0.... L) (2.2.6. ) 
whilst the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in any 
two periods is given by 
u' (c j)/u' 
(ci) _ ((1+S)/(l+r)) 
j-i (jai) (2.2.7. ) 
(2.2.7. ) again implies that consumption is growing at a steady rate 
from period to period, decreasing at a steady rate, or constant 
through time depending on the relative magnitude of rand S. This 
result has straightforward economic meaning. If the market rate of 
interest'is greater than the rate of time preference the individual 
can always increase the value of his lifetime utility by delaying 
consumption and investing his income. On the other hand, if the rate 
of interest is less than the rate of time preference lifetime utility 
will be raised by borrowing and bringing forward consumption. 
To analyse the life cycle model in more detail a continuous 
31 
C1 
Cl (a) 
Cl (b) 
Cl (c) 
Figure 2.2.1 
C0 (a) C0 (b) C (c) C 
00 
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time formulation will be used. This has the advantage that it accords 
more closely with economic theory than its discrete time analogue in 
that consumption/accumulation decisions are assumed to take place 
continuously over time. 
In such a model the individual is assumed to maximise the 
intertemporal utility function 
u= 
JL 
u(c(t))e-St dt (u' (0) 
O 
subject to the accumulation and terminal constraints 
fc(t) = rk(t) + y(t) - c(t) (2.2.9. ) 
and k(L) 0 (2.2.10. ) 
where y(t) is non-capital income and k(t) is non-human wealth at the 
beginning of period t. Both the rate of interest, r, and the subjective 
rate of time preference, S, are known constants - this assumption is to 
t 
latertbe replaced by that of r and 6 being known functions of time 
The maximisation of (2.2.8. ) subject to (2.2.9. ) and (2.2.10. ) 
is a straightforward problem in the calculus of variations3. Intro- 
ducing the Lagrange multiplier a(t) one obtains the expression 
fL 
ti u(c(t))e_at dt +J X(t) 
(rk(t) + y(t) - c(t) - 
k(t))dt 
O0 (2.2.11. ) 
Integrating A(t)'k(t) by parts and substituting back into (2.2.11. ) 
yields 
4= 
iL 
u c(t) e-at dt + JL k(t) 
(rk(t) 
+ y(t) - c(t)) dt + 
00 
L 
f(t) k (t) dt - J1(L)k(L) - J1(O)k(O) (2.2.12. ) O 
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Differentiating (2.2.12. ) with respect to c(t), k(t) and k(L) yields 
u' (c(t))e-St - A(t) =0 (2.2.13. ) i 
X(t)r + i(t) =0 (2.2.13. ) ii 
X (L) Ok (L) ?! 0 (2.2.13. ) iii 
the last condition holding with complementary slackness. From (2.2.13. ) i 
and (2.2.13. ) ii 
-r u'(c(t))e-6t = (d/dt){u' c(t) e-6t} (2.2.14. ) 
which is the standard Euler equation result in the calculus of 
variations. In addition, (2.2.13. ) i and (2.2.13. ) iii yield the 
terminal constraint 
A (L) = u' 
(c (L) } e^dt (2.2.15. ) 
Differentiating (2.2.14. ) and setting the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of consumption -u" (c (t) 
}. c (t) / u' (c (t)) =o (c (t)) yields the 
time path of consumption 
c (t) /c (t) _ (r-d) /0 (c (t) (2.2.16. ) 
If it is assumed that the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption is constant the implications for the growth rate of 
consumption of the relative magnitudes of r and d, as given in (2.2.7. ) 
are again confirmed. 
One can allow for the possibility that the growth rate of 
consumption changes over the life cycle by making the assumption that 
r(") and 6(") are known functions. Repeating the maximisation will 
reveal that (2.2.10. ) becomes4 
a(t)/c(t) = (r (t) -d (t) )/0 (2.2.17. ) 
4ý0 
Having now derived the optimal time path of consumption with 
y("), r(") and S(") all unspecified functions little can be said about 
the accumulation path. Although it can be said that it will be the 
difference between consumption and income in every period one cannot 
say, a priori, whether the time path of accumulation will exhibit the 
Harrod 'hump', will be rapidly rising or diminishing, or be constant. 
In any case, as interest is only to be focussed on qualitative changes 
in accumulation its exact specification is not crucial. For this reason 
the consumption model will be used in the perfectly general form 
described above. 
Before going on to consider the introduction of a state 
pension into the above model and the effect this will have on the 
accumulation/consumption path the following point can provide an intro- 
duction to the analysis. The individual's budget constraint (2.2.9. ) 
can be written 
ýL 
c(t)e-rt dt = k00) + 
JO 
Y(t)e-rt dt (2.2.18. ) 
0O 
where the left hand side is total lifetime consumption and the right 
hand side total lifetime wealth. Changes in income affect consumption 
only through changes in total wealth: specifically, a higher value of 
total wealth will result in a higher value of lifetime consumption. The 
effect on consumption in every period will be given by solving (2.2.17. ) 
for c0 and deriving a relationship between this and (2.2.18. ). This 
problem is held over until section 2.4. 
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2.3 STATE PENSIONS AND OPTIMAL RETIREMENT 
From what has just been said it should be fairly clear what the 
significance of introducing a state pension scheme into the above 
model is going to be. Interest is to be focussed on how the intro- 
duction of a pension scheme will affect capital accumulation or 
consumption. There are two important points. The first is that 
depending on the relationship between pension contributions and 
benefits lifetime income and therefore total wealth can rise or fall. 
Secondly, if retirement is endogenous to the individual, then the 
pension scheme allows the income stream to become a variable-to be 
chosen by the individual through the choice of the retirement date. 
These are the problems to be analysed. 
The state pension scheme is assumed to operate on a flat 
rate basis. Irrespective of income the individual contributes an annual 
sum, a, into the scheme in return for an annual pension p. The pension 
is payable from period Tl, (O<T1<L). This means that the restrictions 
on net income in every period can be written 
w(t)-a if OAt<T and Tl`-T<L 
y(t) 
P if T&t<L and Tl'T<L (2.3.1. ) 
Now (2.3.1. ) is clearly a constraint in the maximisation problem just 
outlined. The fact that it has been ignored up until now is not really 
crucial since one can invoke here the separation theorem which concerns 
the independence of investment or portfolio decisions and accumulation 
decisions. The separation theorem can be applied to this analysis since 
4z 
the assumption that there exists a perfect capital 
market implies that the individual faces a single budget 
ocnstraint. When one can assume separability the procedure for 
optimality is to maximise lifetime income and then maximise utility 
subject to an investment plan which maximises lifetime income. 
Although this analysis has plainly proceeded in the in- 
correct sequence it is thought to be analytically neater to consider 
utility maximisation first and then income maximisation. It just has 
to be remembered that the first plan depends on the second. 
To analyse the individual's problem two cases will be 
considered. Firstly it can be assumed that the individual is free to 
choose his retirement date, T, and makes a choice which maximises the 
discounted present value of lifetime income, which will be denoted 
Y(T). On the other hand it can be assumed that the retirement date is 
institutionally determined to be Tl. The former case is similar to that 
analysed by Feldstein (19) and the results derived will be comparable 
with those of the Appendix to Chapter 1. The latter case represents a 
situation without induced retirement as might be the case with a well 
developed state scheme. 
If the individual is free to choose his retirement date then 
from (2.3.1. ) the discounted present value of lifetime income is given 
by 
Tt 
Y(T) _ (w(t)-a)exp(- 
O0 
L It 
r(T)dT) dt +p exp(- 
T0 
r(T) d1) dt 
(T: ýT1) (2.3.2. ) 
With the state pension only payable from T1, if T<T1 the second 
expression in (2.3.2. ) will only apply from Tl. This will only occur if 
w(t) =0 at the end of the individual's working life, an unlikely occurrence. 
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To reduce the algebraic complexity of the analysis write 
R(t) = exp(-JO r(T) di) - this is then the discounted present value 
of a pound received in period t. The first order condition on retire- 
ment can now be written as 
YT =(w(T) -a- p) R(T) =0 (2.3.3. ) 
which says that at the optimum the discounted present values of net 
wage income and pension income must be equal5. There will also be the 
second order condition for an interior maximum 
YTT = (w(T)-a-p} R' (T) - w' (T)R(T) <0 (2.3.4. ) 
which is a requirement that the marginal cost fofr-. postponing retire- 
ment should be changing more slowly than the marginal benefit from so 
doing. The marginal cost of postponing retirement is the discounted 
present value of pension income foregone whilst the marginal benefit 
is the discounted present value of net wage income. This condition 
implies that w'(t)<O for T1! gt<L. 
A problem arises with this analysis when the optimum retire- 
meat date is T1 since this is a cornea solution. Such a situation is 
shown in Figure 2.3.1. If the state pension is p then the optimal 
retirement date, as given by (2.3.3. ), will be T in the diagram - this 
retirement date will change for small parameter shifts. When the state 
pension is p', Tl is the optimum retirement date. At T1 p'>w(T1)-a and 
the optimum will in many cases not change for small parameter shifts. 
This might also be the case if p' = w(T1)-a. The condition for T1 to be 
optimal is not then (2.3.3. ) but 
pR (T1) N 
(w (T1) -a) R (T1) 
>0 
0 (2.3.5. ) 
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Implied by this is a modification of the comparative statics effects 
of parameter changes when T=T1 - in particular the magnitude of the 
changes will be important. While this problem has been recognised it 
is not to be considered in any more detail. 
The case of the institutionally determined retirement date 
can be dealt with fairly summarily since (2.3.2. ) will now be written 
JT1(w(t)_a)R(t) L 
Y(T1) = dt +p R(t) dt (2.3.6. ) 
O T1 
Beyond this little can be said - the individual is faced with this 
situation and has to accept it. 
2.4 STATE PENSIONS AND PERSONAL SAVINGS 
The effect of the pension scheme on personal savings can be considered 
in two parts, the first concerned with the existence of the scheme and 
the second with changes in pension contributions and benefits. 
Consider firstly the impact of the introduction of a scheme 
with an institutional retirement date. In the absence of a pension 
scheme lifetime income is given by 
Y* (T) =r w(t) R (t) dt (2.4.1. ) 
O 
Let 
L 
Y*(T) = max{Y*(T)}= w(t) R (t) dt (2.4.2. ) 
O 
since the optimal retirement date will be characterised by w(T) = 0. 
As outlined earlier one is interested in discovering the effect of the 
pension scheme on lifetime income. Thus (2.4.2. ) has to be compared 
with 
µ6 
(L T (L 
Y (T) = Y* (T) -Jw (t) R (t) dt -a 
(1R 
(t) dt +pJR (t) dt (2.4.3) 
T1 )O Tl 
where T1 is the official retirement date. Once this retirement date 
is set the difference between (2.4.2) and (2.4.3) will depend on the 
values of a and p (or the rate of return to the pension scheme) and 
the wage possibilities after T1. Clearly this difference cannot be 
determined a priori - it follows that the eventual effect on savings 
cannot be evaluated. The same result will apply when the scheme 
allows the individual to retire on or after period T1. The relevant 
comparison is then between (2.4.2) and 
Y (T) = max {Y (T) } 
T . T1 (2.4.4) 
To determine the effect of changes in pension parameters on 
personal savings one can consider the effect of a small increase in 
pension contributions and benefits on income. Therefore let 
(T (L 
Y(T, mq) = Y(T) - 1mal R(t) dt + mJ R(t) dt (2.4.5) )0 T 
and 
Y (tn) = max 
{Y(Txn)} 
TT (2.4.6) 
where m is the amount by which pension benefits are increased and km 
the amount by which contributions are increased. k is some exogenous 
constant. Now if a is increased by a further small amount then the 
effect on income will be given by 
dYaaY+3Y, ar Fm am aT -dm (2.4.7) 
If1 
the first component being a direct effect (with T held constant) and 
the second being an indirect effect operating through induced 
retirement, if retirement is endogenous. 
From (2.3.2) the direct effect of an increase in contributions 
and benefits is to reduce and increase lifetime income respectively. 
To relate this to a final impact on savings consider the solution to 
(2.2.17), which can be written 
((L 
C= coil exp (r(t) - d(t))/O dt} `0 
(2.4.8) 
where C is the present value of lifetime consumption, and c0 is 
consumption in the initial period. From A3 (2.4.8) can be rewriten 
Co = Y(T)/J exp 
{[r(t) 
- d(t) 
l 
I/O dt} (2.4.9) 
(LO 
)J 
whilst consumption in each period is given by 
c(t) =C0 exp 
{Jt (r(T) 
- d(T)l )/6 dTl } (2.4.10) 
0 JJ 
An increase in pension contributions, a, results in Y(T) 
falling which, from (2.4.9) and (2.4.10), results in a lower level 
of consumption in every period. Pension income is unchanged so that 
retirement saving is higher in every period (or, more likely, dissaving 
lower). A3 implies that the present value of lifetime savings is zero. 
It must then follow that savings during the work period falls. Feldstein's 
analysis was undertaken on the assumption that there was only a savings 
replacement effect. In this analysis it is an income effect that is, being 
described, although substitution between pension savings and alternatives 
is taking place. 
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An increase in pension benefits, p, increases the value of 
Y(T) and, using the above argument, consumption in every period will 
be higher. As net wage income is unaffected savings during the work 
period falls and there is a compensating increase/decrease in 
retirement saving/dissaving. This is a fairly easily understood 
result in that workers will finance a high level of consumption by 
borrowing out of a higher retirement income. 
The indirect component is appropriate when the retirement 
date is not institutionally determined and there can therefore be an 
optimal adjustment of the retirement date to the new conditions. 
(2.4.7) implies that the change in the retirement date will affect 
lifetime income. It will in fact be the case though that this 
indirect component is always equal to zero. This can be demonstrated 
by considering the first order condition for the maximization of 
(2.4.5) with respect to T, which is 
YT+1-O A 30. T Tl 
the inequalities holding with complementary slackness. 
If A>O, the solution is at a corner and T= T1. dT/dm =0 
so that the indirect component in (2.4.7) is zero. If T>Tl then A=0 
and aY/2T =0- again the indirect component will be zero. This is an 
envelope result. 
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Nevertheless the effect of the change in pension variables 
on the retirement date still has to be considered. From (2.3.3) the 
direction of optimal retirement adjustment is given by 
YTa 
R (T) =0 
YT 
P 
which implies early retirement. This is explained by the fact 
(2.4.11) 
that increases in both a and p make retirement attractive relative 
to work. 
Now, of course, it could be argued that changes in pension 
variables and, by implication, the introduction of pension schemes 
has an impact that is scarcely marginal. What the above argument 
does seem to suggest is that most of the qualitative effect will 
be captured through the direct effect. Even in the case where 
pension contributions are changed by a fairly large amount and 
the indirect effect works in the opposite direction to the direct 
effect, it will still be the direct effect that dominates. To 
learn a little more about this consider Figure 2.4.1. If contributions 
are given by a the optimal retirement date is T and the present value 
of lifetime income in the area 
ädfLo. In the event of contributions 
increasing to a', without any retirement adjustment, the present value 
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Figure 2.4.1 
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-a'ýR(T) 
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of lifetime income falls to the area bgdfLo. The area abgd is lost. 
Optimal retirement adjustmentproduces an optimum at T' with a gain 
in lifetime income of edg. For early retirement to compensate for-the 
earlier income loss edg>abgd. In this model such an outcome is not 
possible and the net effect on savings is therefore unambiguous. 
It is easily checked from Figure 2.4.1 that increasing 
pension benefits involves no such conflict. 
2.5 INCOME TAXATION, LEISURE AND BEQUEST BEHAVIOUR 
(a) Income Taxation. So far income taxation, apart from the flat 
rate pension contribution, has been ignored. As income taxation is 
to be omitted from the analysis to follow it will be shown in this 
section how it might be included in the model of the state pension 
scheme. 
Consider the following schema. Non-pension income, net of 
the pension contribution, is subject to a proportional tax at a rate 
u*. The state pension is payable from Tl even if the individual 
retires after that date. Over the interval 
(T11T) 
pension income is 
subject to a proportion tax at a rate u**. 
This 
arrangement can be 
thought of as a simplified earnings rule. 
The discounted present value of lifetime income is now given 
by 
T 
Y (T) =J 
0 
+ 
jL 
T 
( Tl 
(1-u*) Iw(t) - a) R(t) dt + pIfT (1-u**) R(t) dt lJ 
R(t) dt] (2.5.1) 
5a 
Optimal retirement requires 
YT = (1-u*) 
[w(T) 
- a. 
) 
R(T) - u** pR(T) =0 (2.5.2) 
This can be seen to be similar to (2.3.3) but for the inclusion of 
a term (1-u**) pR(T) in (2.5.2), reflecting the fact that pension 
income is payable over the interval 
(Tl, 
T). 
An interesting comparative statics result to consider is the 
effect of an increase in the pension tax i. e., a toughening of the 
earnings rule. From (2.5.1) increasing u** reduces Y(T) which implies 
a lower level of consumption in every period. Over the intervals 
(0, 
T 11 and 
(T, 
LL income is unchanged and savings therefore higher - it 
follows that over IT1, 
+ 
when both labour income and pension are 
payable, savings must fall. 
From (2.5.2) optimal retirement adjustment is given by 
YTU** = -p R (T) <0 (2.5.3) 
which again implies early retirement, which is understandable since 
work has become relatively unattractive. Again, for non marginal 
changes in the tax rate there appears to be the possibility of an 
ambiguous outcome, since optimal retirement adjustment will increase 
Y(T). Figure 2.5.1 demonstrates that full compensation is not possible. 
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If the rate of pension tax rises from u** to u and the 
retirement date remains at T then the present value of lifetime income 
falls by an amount given by the area abcd. Optimal retirement adjust- 
ment can only regain the area cde which will always be less than abcd. 
This result is the same as the one arrived at by 
Feldstein outlined in the Appendix to Chapter 1. 
(b) Leisure. It has so far been assumed that work and consumption 
decisions are separable - leisure does not enter the individual's 
utility function. 
A convenient way to analyse the role of leisure is to 
summarise the standard life cycle model of labour leisure choice and 
then see what effect the inclusion of the state pension would have. 
Assume that an individual maximises the additive separable utility 
function 
fo 
-d (t) 
{u(c(t)) 
+v 
(L(t))} 
e dt (2.5.4) 
subject to the accumulation constraint 
k(t) = r(t)k(t) + h(t)w(t) c(t) (2.5.5) 
and the terminal constraint (2.2.10) where u(. ) is subject to the 
same restrictions as u(. ); ! t(t) is the amount of time devoted to 
leisure; h(t) the amount of time spent at work and w(. ) the pattern 
of wage rates. 
't 
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The maximisation of (2.5.4) subject to (2.5.5) and (2.2.10) 
yields first order conditions for optimal accumulation the same as 
in the problem analysed in Section 2.2 but as there is an additional 
control variable, £(t), there is an additional condition 
ý' I1ý(t)Je-S 
(t) 
u' Ic(t)1w(t)e-S 
(t) (2.5.6) 
This, as in the static theory of the allocation of time, tells us that in 
the work period the marginal rate of substitution between work and 
leisure is equated to the wage rate i. e. 
u' 
( 
1t(t))/u' Ic(t)1 = w(t) (2.5.7) 
whilst the individual will be retired if 
u' 
H> 
u' 
(c(t)J 
w(t) (2.5.8) 
[11 
indicating that h (t) = 0. 
Differentiating (2.5.7) logarithimically and setting - 
R(t)U"IR(t)I/U'(i(t)) =E (constant) yields the time path of leisure 
R(t)/R (t) = ir(t) - ö(t) - w(t)J/ (2.5.9) 
where w(t) is the instantaneous growth rate of wages. This says that 
if the net rate of discount 
(r(t) 
- w(t)) exceeds the rate of time 
preference then leisure is increasing through time. If a point is 
reached where (2.5.8) holds the individual will retire. Keeping to 
the case where Ir(t) - w(t)) > S(t), this can be represented 
diagramtically as shown in Figure 2.5.1 where the utility equivalent 
of the wage rate is falling. Beyond T the utility derived from 
taking all increments of time in leisure exceeds the utility equivalent 
of the wage rate. The individual will thus be retired from T. 
8 
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Figure 2.5.1 
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Giving the individual may retire in the absence of any pension 
arrangement it can now be seen how these results interact with those 
derived for pension schemes in the absence of leisure considerations. 
The analysis differs from that of the previous section in that 
it is now necessary to compare work and retirement marginal utility 
streams - where they are equal will give the optimal retirement date. 
utility during the work period will be the sum of the marginal utility 
equivalent of net wage income and the utility derived from leisure 
whilst retirement utility will be the sum of the marginal utility 
equivalent of the state pension and the utility derived from spending 
all ones time in leisure. 
A retirement date is chosen to maximise 
U= fT 
O 
{u'{ct](ht; 
t_a) + UI 
`t(t)De 
t) dt + 
ýL {u' [c(t)Jp 
+ 
ý1J ýe d (t) dt (2.5.10) 
and this will be the date where 
{u'[cT)[hT; 
T_aJ +u 
(k 
(T) Je-S 
(T) 
= 
{u'{c(T))p 
+U 1J j. e-6 
(T) 
which when written in the form 
(c 
(T)) 
(h(T)w(T) 
-a- pI = u(1) - výk(T)ý (2.5.11) 
can be directly compared with (2.3.3). 
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Now if the individual moves smoothly from the work period into 
the retirement period, in the sense that there is no discontinuity in 
L(. ), then (2.5.11) reduces to (2.3.3), the optimal retirement 
condition in both cases being w(T) -a-p=0, remembering that 
w (T) =h (T) w (T) . However, if there is a discontinuity in 9(. ), and 
this can be supported either by recognising the existence of a statutory 
minimum working week or arguing that it is a feature of a life cycle 
when there is a pension arrangement, then the above analysis has to be 
modified. In particular, the possibility then arises that an 
individual will retire when w(T) -a >p since the discontinuity in the 
leisure stream can only imply that u[l) > v(9., (T)). Such an outcome is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.5.2, where the top half of the diagram refers 
to a comparison of income streams whilst the bottom half compares 
utility streams. 
This graphical representation brings home one point rather 
clearly in that where the administered value of the state pension is 
low, and in the previous analysis an interior maximum was thought to 
be unlikely, the inclusion of leisure in the analysis might increase 
its likelihood although will still not make it certain. 
9 
To establish the effect of the inclusion of leisure on 
accumulation one would have to know the effect on lifetime income. 
This reduces to a problem of comparing the endogenous and exogenous 
wage streams and the optimal retirement dates in each case. In the 
general model considered here such a comparison is not possible. As 
for the comparative statics results (2.5.10) and (2.5.11) suggest that 
there is no reason to believe that changes in pension contributions 
and benefits will affect optimal accumulation and retirement in any way 
that is likely to be different to those outlined in the previous 
section. 
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(c) Bequest Behaviour. There are a number of ways that A3 may be 
relaxed. It would be easiest to include in (2.3.2) the additional 
term 
(k(O) 
- k(L) 
I 
representing respectively the discounted present 
values of bequests received and left. The discounted present value 
of lifetime savings is then k(L) and as long as bequests are fixed 
at this level all the earlier results go through. In effect, bequests, 
as long as they are fixed, are irrelevent. 
It is possible to allow for bequests to be variable, dependent 
on utility considerations. In such a case it can be assumed that the 
individual maximises a utility function of the form 
fL__ 
U ul 
(c(t) Ie s(t) dt + SZI(k(L))e s(L) (2.5.12) `l 0 
subject to the accumulation constraint (2.1.2). The solution to this 
problem is the same as that analysed in Section 2.2 but for a change 
in the terminal constraint which becomes 
u' 
(c(L)) 
= no 
(k(L)) 
(2.5.13) 
which says that at the optimum the marginal utility of a terminal 
bequest must equal the marginal utility of terminal consumption. 
(2.5.13) defines k(L) as a function of co, the relationship 
between the two being dependent on the relative elasticities of u(. ) 
and n(. ) evaluated at L. It should be noted that the initial level 
of consumption will not be the same as in (2.4.3) which implied that 
c0 has some proportion of Y(T), the proportion depending on length 
of life, age, the rates of interest and time preference and tastes 
(the form of the utility function). Unlike (2.4.3) the definition of 
lifetime income or now, more correctly, net worth has to be modified 
to include the discounted present values of inheritances received and 
bequests left, which are unlikely to be equal. 
-ý ý 
This analysis has been fully exploited in many areas of 
economic analysis but probably to its greatest advantage in 
considering problems of wealth distribution (see Meade (44), 
Atkinson (7): and Ishikawa (32)). Unfortunately it holds only 
slight interest for this analysis - the qualitative nature of the 
results outlined are unlikely to be affected. This section has 
served only to show how the modification to include optimal bequest 
behaviour might be made. 
10 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has seen the introduction of a state pension scheme into 
a continuous time life cycle model of consumption and accumulation. 
In a model where the results are not in any sense forced it has been 
shown that 
i) A priori the effect on accumulation of introducing a 
pension scheme into an economy cannot be determined. 
ii) With the type of pension scheme assumed on optimal 
retirement date will require wages to be falling in the region of 
Tl, unless leisure considerations are taken into account. This 
optimal retirement date will normally be earlier than in a model 
without pensions. 
iii) Increasing pension contributions and benefits always 
induces early retirement. This adjustment can only reinforce the 
reduction in work period savings brought about when pension benefits 
increase and work against, though n eve r compensate for, the 
reduction in work period savings that results from an increase in 
b2 
pension contributions. To translate these changes into aggregate 
terms with a stationary population and no wage growth through time 
aggregate savings does not change. If there is population or wage 
growth the behaviour of the young (or workers) will always dominate 
the aggregate. 
iv) If there is an earnings rule the tax on pension income 
implies that savings will be higher over the work period up until 
T1 and after retirement. Aggregate savings will therefore be 
higher. 
v) The inclusion of leisure in the utility function world 
could make an interior solution to the individuals optimum retirement 
problem more likely, but is unlikely to affect the comparative statics 
results. 
vi) The inclusion of bequests can change the level of 
consumption, and therefore savings, in every period. The direction 
of this change is indeterminate. Comparative statics results are not 
affected. 
fý3 
NOTES 
1. This model is fairly well established in the literature - the 
most thorough expositions are those of Green (26), using a 
discrete time formulation, and Yaari (61), using the continuous 
time analogue. 
2. For this marginal gain in generality one loses consistency in 
the sense of Strotz (56) due to the variable discount rate. 
of course, there are no clear reasons why one should require 
consistency in this restrictive sense. 
3. This method is outlined in a number of texts. See for example 
Dixit (17), Hadley and Kemp (28). 
4. See Blinder (13), pp. 50-54. 
5. With w(t)>O it will always be optimal for TaTl since Y(T) can 
always be increased by working up to T1. 
6. More precisely, given the form of the utility function the 
functions r(. ) and d(. ) and the value of lifetime consumption 
one solves for the initial condition. This is done in (2.4.3). 
7. In the description of Feldstein's analysis in Chapter 1, the 
slope of the budget line changes. 
ý (e) 
B. The problem of initial conditions is rather complex - it is 
fully analysed in Blinder (13), pp. 67-75. 
9. It also allows the possibility of a maximum when w'(t)>O. 
10. One might also follow Atkinson (7) who suggests that the 
introduction of bequests permits the relaxation of the 
assumption of a perfect capital market since if it is assumed 
r(t)>d(t) and the individual can borrow against future bequests 
it becomes inessential. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRIVATE PENSIONS, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND RETIREMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter it was assumed that the only pension 
arrangement available to the individual was arranged through the 
state. In this chapter a private scheme is introduced from which 
the individual can receive payment some years before he becomes 
eligible to receive the state pension. 
In the next section the private pension arrangements are 
described in detail. Two types of scheme are considered, one 
terminal salary based and one money purchase based. These are 
analysed separately in sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
The relationship between these schemes, capital 
accumulation and retirement behaviour is considered in section 3.5. 
Lastly, in section 3.6, the money purchase scheme will be 
modified to allow for an uncertain lifetime. 
3.2 PRIVATE PENSION ARRANGEMENTS 
Four general categories of private pension scheme can be distinguished, 
flat rate, terminal salary, average salary and money purchase schemes. 
As the flat rate scheme is similar to the state pension scheme and 
terminal and average salary schemes are similar only terminal salary 
and money purchase schemes will be described. 
W. 
Terminal salary schemes are organised in the following way. 
During his working life the individual contributes aw(t), (O<a<l), 
where w(. ) is wage income, into the scheme. In return for these 
contributions he receives a pension ß(T)W(T), (O<ß<l) where the 
scale of benefits, given by the function ß(. ) is a function of the 
retirement date, T. The earliest date of receipt of this pension 
is TO<T, and the income it provides will be denoted y(T). If this 
were an average salary scheme the pension would be based not on the 
last years salary but an average of salaries received over the last 
few years of work. 
Money purchase schemes give the individual more scope as 
to the size of his pension contributions and hence the pension he 
receives. The individual makes payments into the scheme at a rate 
f(t) and the fund accumulates these payments at a rate s(t) to 
obtain a gross fund. 
fT (/t 
F= f (t) exp IJs (T) dT 
Idt 
(3.2.1) 
0`0 
On retirement he receives a pension P=P(F, T) where P(. ) is an 
increasing function of both its arguments. Again the earliest date 
of receipt will be denoted T0<Tl. 
An assumption at the beginning of the last chapter stated 
that there was a perfect capital market in which the individual can 
borrow and lend, through the selling and purchase of bonds, at a 
rate r(t). Something now has to be said about the relationship 
between the rate of return in this perfect market and the rate of 
return to pension contributions, s(t). 
If s(t)>r(t) for all t, then it would clearly pay the 
individual to borrow large amounts of money and transfer it into the 
fund. This is not a desirable feature of equilibrium. There are a 
number of ways around this problem. One might make some form of 
institutional assumption about individual behaviour. It is clearly only 
advantageous for the individual to invest in the pension asset alone 
if he can withdraw his funds at will. The ability to withdraw could 
be removed. 
A more convenient assumption to make is that s(t) -cr(t) over 
the interval 
(OPT). 
As it is no longer worthwhile investing in the 
fund the individual simply transfers a capital sum F into the fund 
on retirement. The individual will do this either because the fund 
uses any portfolio advantages it has over the individual to offer a 
higher stream of income on F than could be obtained in the open market 
over the period 
(T, 
L) or because of the convenience of such an 
arrangement. For the moment this is the assumption which will be 
adopted but it is to be discussed further in section 3.6. 
3.3 THE TERMINAL SALARY SCHEME1 
If it is assumed that there are no state pension contributions2 the 
restrictions on net income in every period can be written 
(1-ci) w (t) if O<t<T 
Y (t) =ß (T) W (T) (T) if T4, t<T2 
y (T) +p if T2<t<L (3.3.1) 
Using these restrictions the present value of lifetime income is given 
by 
bs 
T fT L(LT2 
Y(T) = (1-a)Jp w(t) R(t) dt + y(T) R(t) dt + pJ R(t) dt (3.3.2) 
where T2 = max {T1, T}. Proceeding as in the previous chapter the 
first 
order condition for optimal retirement is 
yT y (T) -P (dT2/dT) 
IR 
(T) +y (T) R (t) dt =0 
fT L 
O for TGt<T1 
(dT/dT) ={0 21 for T1Ft<L (3.3.3) 
which says that at the margin the discounted present value of net wage 
----income. plus-the, gain"i, or,, minus the loss from delaying retirement 
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(( l-c w (T) R (T) (T) `R(t) " dt) must equal '. the the discounted, present k 
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i 
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;, "B 
value of pension income (y(T)R(T) + p(dT2/dT)R(T)). 
The above first order condition will not be appropriate when, 
as will quite often be the case, the optimal retirement 
date is exactly 
Tl and remains there for small parameter shifts. The problem 
is that 
the function Y(. ) is not differentiable at Ti, but has a left hand 
derivative YT_ and a lower right hand derivative YT+. The condition 
for T1 to be optimal is that YT_ >, 0 YT+, which reduces to 
-L 
p3 (1-a) w(T1) - y(T1) + YOM 1) J 
Tl 
R(t)/R(TI) dt 
>0 
`ýFCy, ac. wawý. +nzýn++s.... wR-.. ,,. w w,,. ý.. _.., rrmý; ýý. 
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{3.3.4) 
Where the inequality =... ». ý.. holds T1 will be optimal and remain so for small 
parameter shifts if the present value of state pension exceeds, the 
difference between the marginal cost (in terms of private pension 
only) and marginal benefit of delaying retirement, also evaluated at 
Tl. Where the equality holds it will be the case that whilst certain 
parameter shifts will change the optimal choice of T others will not. 
This will also be the case when the inequality holds and 
L 
(1-a)w(T1)R(T1) + yo(TJT R(t) dt = y(T1)R(Tl) 
l 
0 
If s(t)>r(t) for all t, then it would clearly pay the 
individual to borrow large amounts of money and transfer it into the 
fund. This is not a desirable feature of equilibrium. There are a 
number of ways around this problem. One might make some form of 
institutional assumption about individual behaviour. It is clearly only 
advantageous for the individual to invest in the pension asset alone 
if he can withdraw his funds at will. The ability to withdraw could 
be removed. 
A more convenient assumption to make is that s(t)<r(t) over 
the interval 
(OTJ. 
As it is no longer worthwhile investing in the 
fund the individual simply transfers a capital sum F into the fund 
on retirement. The individual will do this either because the fund 
uses any portfolio advantages it has over the individual to offer a 
higher stream of income on F than could be obtained in the open market 
over the period 
(T, 
L) or because of the convenience of such an 
arrangement. For the moment this is the assumption which will be 
adopted but it is to be discussed further in section 3.6. 
3.3 THE TERMINAL SALARY SCHEME1 
If it is assumed that there are no state pension contributions2 the 
restrictions on net income in every period can be written 
(1-a)w(t) if Ost<T 
y (t) =ß (T) W (T) _ 'Y (T) if T. <t<T2 
y(T) +p if T2ct<L (3.3.1) 
Using these restrictions the present value of lifetime income is given 
by 
Jo 
i) w'(T)<O, w" (T)>O, y(T)>O. A falling wage structure in 
the region of retirement would be found where the lifetime income 
profile is humped. For pension income also to be falling it is 
necessary that w'(T)/w(T) > (-) ß'(T)/ß(T). To determine whether an 
interior solution is likely the correct procedure would be to 
substitute y(T) = ß(T)w(T) into (3.3.5) and determine the values of 
the parameters of the equations that guarantee such a solution. A more 
convenient procedure is simply to derive a minimum set of conditions 
that have to be fulfilled for an interior maximum. Figure 3.3.1 
demonstrates that T2, where net wage income equals pension income is 
not a maximum. The first order condition is satisfied at T where the 
loss in wage income from retiring at T rather T2, over the interval 
[T, 
T3), is exactly equal to the gain in pension income from so doing, 
over the interval IT3, L1. This case is rather contrived in that the 
assumption that ß<1 together with the relatively low administered 
values of p imply that in many cases T2 will not be interior. From 
Figure 3.3.2 it is clear that this does not matter -T can still be 
interior as long as max {y(T) + p} > min {w(T)(1-a)}. This analysis 
easily extends to the case where y'(T)>O but in this case T2, as just 
defined, has to be interior since if this were not true then 
max {y(T) + p} < min {w(T) (1-a) }. 
ii) w(T)>O, W" (T) <O, y(T)>O. From Figure 3.3.3 it is 
again clear that T2 has to be interior. It is therefore necessary 
that ß'(T)/ß(T) > w(T)/w(T). This is a deceptive case since it would 
appear at first that retirement is never worthwhile since there are 
always pension and wage gains to be had from delaying retirement. 
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Indeed if the individual retires at T3 lifetime income is higher than 
if retirement is at T2. But if retirement is delayed until T4 the 
horizontal shaded area is gained whilst the diagonal shaded area is 
lost. If at the margin these two areas are equal then an optimal 
retirement date has been defined. This is denoted T. In this case an 
optimum will be unlikely - with a rising income stream over the later 
part of the--life cycle it is unlikely that p> 
{l_c_(T)) 
w(T) which 
is the necessary condition for T2 to be interior. 
The aim of this brief analysis of interior solutions has been 
to determine the plausible wage profiles in the region of retirement. 
If this last point is accepted, and with rising wages it can be assumed 
that T2 will not normally be interior, the wage stream will have to be 
decreasing. Comparative statics analysis will be undertaken on this 
assumption. 
3.4 THE MONEY PURCHASE SCHEME3 
From the description of this type of pension arrangement given in 
section 3.2 the discounted present value of lifetime income will be a 
function of both the retirement date and the size of the pension fund. 
Specifically 
fT ( fT 
Y(F, T) = w(t)R(t) dt - R(T)F + P(F, T) 
L 
J R(t) dt +pL R( t) dt 
OT2 
(3.4.1) 
where again T2 = max {T1, T} and remembering that F is the sum of 
money transferred into the pension fund on retirement. 
-)s 
There will now be two first order conditions for a maximum 
fL 
Y 
F= -R(T) + 
PFR(t) dt 40 for FAO (3.4.2) 
TL 
YT = 
[w(T) 
- P(F, T) - P(dT2/dT)J R(T) - R"(T)F + PTJ R(t) dt =0 
T 
0 for T <t<T 
2 
(dT/dT) _ {1 for TQ t<L1 (3.4.3) 
If T1 is optimal and remains there for small parameter shifts 
L 
p> w(T1) -P (F, Tl) - 
{R(T1)/R(T1))F 
+ PTJR(t)/R(T1) dt 
T1 
>0 (3.4.4) 
The first order condition for optimal retirement has the same inter- 
pretation as previously. That for the optimum size of the fund says 
that at the margin the discounted present value of. the marginal 
pension income from the fund should equal the discounted present 
value of a bond purchased on retirement. The present value of an 
additional unit of pension wealth is the present value of the income 
it yields whilst the present value of an increment of capital is 
simply R(T). If it is assumed that PF(O, T) °- +- for all T>, TO then 
this first order condition will hold with F>O. 
To determine whether or not it is worthwhile for the individual 
to accumulate a fund it can be noted that if P(. ) is concave in F then 
P(F, T)/F > PF(F, T) for all F>O. Thus from (3.4.2) 
P (F, T) R (t) dt >R (T) F 
fT L 
(3.4.5) 
which implies that the individual will gain from investing in the 
pension asset. It will therefore always benefit the individual to 
accumulate a pension fund. 
7(0 
The second order conditions for an interior maximum are 
L 
YFF = PFFJ R(t) dt <O (3.4.6) 
T 
YTT = 
(w(T) 
- 2PT -p (d2T2/dT2)) R (T) + 
(w(T) 
-P (F , T) - 
l (L 
p(dT2/dT)) R(T) - Rýý(T)F + PSI R(t) dt <0 (3.4.7) 
JT 
YFF 
TT - 
(YFT, ) 
2>O 
(L 
where YFr = PFT "R(t) dt - R(T) PF - R(T) (3.4.8) 
T 
(3.4.6) implies that PFF <0 whilst (3.4.7) is again the standard 
requirement that the marginal cost function should cut the marginal 
benefit function from below. 
To examine further the implications of these conditions note 
that PFF <0 guarantees that (3.4.3) will determine a'unique value of 
F satisfying YF =0 for all values of T. Denote this value 4(T). The 
restrictions that are then of interest are those that guarantee that as 
T}L, ý(T) +0i. e. the shorter the retirement period the smaller 
the desired fund. 
If YF( (T), T] =0 on 
(TO, L) then ý'(T) = -YFT/YFF. From 
(3.4.6) YFF < O` and it is therefore only necessary to show that 
YFT < 0. Consider firstly the last two terms in (3.4.8). These can 
be written, using (3.4.2) 
l 
R(T)PF - R' (T) _ 
{R(T)2 - 
(R(T)JR(t) 
dt)} (3.4.9) 
rL 
J R( t) dt 
T 
ýý 
If r'(t)>, O for tzT0 then (3.4.9) is positive over the internal 
[TIL]. 
Since r(T) = R'(T)/R(T) then PF>r(T). Beyond this little 
can be said. Certainly for YFT>O marginal pension income must be 
rising and interest rates falling over time. Thus for a large number 
of cases it might not be too unreasonable to assume that YFT<O and 
ý'(T)<O. 
(3.4.7) also reveals that it will often be the case that 
w'(T)<O over 
[TOLJ. 
To examine this further assume that pension 
income, after TO, is independent of the retirement date. Now define 
a function 
g (T) =P 
ýý 
(T) J-r (T) ý (T) (3.4.10) 
which is the marginal cost, in terms of private pension, of delaying 
retirement one year. Differentiating (3.4.10) with respect to T gives 
g' (T) = PF 4'(T) -r (T) 4'(T) - r' (T) f (T) <O (3.4.11) 
From (3.4.6), (3.4.7) and (3.4.8) 
R(T) 
(g' 
(T) - w'(T)J = 
((Y)2 
- YTT*YFF1/YFF>o (3.4.12) 
which with (3.4.11) implies w'(T)<g'(T)< 0. For the particular case 
where pension income is independent of the retirement date and interest 
rates are rising through time the wage profile must falling over 
[TOLJ. 
Of course this does not guarantee that in general this must be 
the case. Nevertheless, in keeping with the decision arrived at in the 
previous section, comparative statics analysis will be undertaken on the 
assumption that w'(T)<O. 
ýg 
With the terminal salary scheme when an optimum existed it 
was assumed to be unique. Given a smooth wage function and a typical 
case where the benefit formula is a linear increasing function of 
years worked there is no reason to believe that this is unreasonable. 
But with the money purchase scheme the arbitrariness of many of the 
functions implies that there might be multiple solutions to the first 
and second order conditions. In Figure 3.4.1 these solutions are 
given by intersections of the functions g(T) +p and w(T): Tl, T2, 
T3, T4 and L all satisfy the first and second order conditions. To 
derive a global maximum it is necessary to substitute the local 
maximum values of F and T into (3.4.1) and compare the resulting 
values of Y (F, T) . 
3.5 PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PERSONAL SAVINGS 
As in Section 2 of Chapter 2 the relationship between pensions and 
savings divides into two parts, the effect of the introduction of the 
pension scheme and the effect of changes in pension parameters on 
savings. 
The effect of introducing the schemes is seen by comparing 
(3.3.2) and (3.4.1) with (2.4.1) with the state pension contributions 
omitted. Employing the framework of the previous chapter, and 
assuming an endogenous retirement decision, whether or not lifetime 
income is raised by the introduction of a scheme will depend on the 
(T (L 
relative magnitudes of af w(t)R(t) dt and y (T) JR (t) dt with a 
oT 
-79 
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terminal salary scheme and R(T)F and P(F, T)R(t) dt with a money 
fT L 
purchase scheme. In the former case the impact on lifetime income 
and therefore savings is indeterminate since the lengths of the work 
and retirement periods, a and the values of w(T) and y (T) are all 
unspecified. A little more can be said in the latter case. If over 
the interval 
[TOIL] 
s(t)>r(t) lifetime income is raised; if s(t)<r(t) 
lifetime income is lowered; if s(t)=r(t) lifetime income is unchanged. 
The effect on lifetime income and therefore savings can be determined 
in all these cases but none really describe the type of arrangement 
outlined. Over 
(O, 
T) r(t)>s(t) whilst from the lifetime income 
maximisation hypothesis lifetime income must be lower in the absence 
of a pension scheme. It follows that over at least part of 
(TEL) 
s(t)>r(t). The higher level of lifetime income implies a lower level 
of work period, and therefore aggregate, savings as a result of the 
introduction of the money purchase scheme. This conclusion can be 
reversed if, as will be shown, the individual might invest in the 
scheme even if it implies a lower level of lifetime income. 
Comparative statics analysis is more straightforward. 
4 
Consider firstly an increase in the state pension, p. From (3.3.2) 
and (3.4.1) this will result in an increase in lifetime income which, 
using (2.4.2), (2.4.3) and (2.4.4), leads to an increase in consumption 
in every period. All other things being equal savings falls during 
the work period. Optimal retirement adjustment, from (3.3.3) and 
(3.4.2) is given, in both cases, by 
YTP = -R(T)(dT2/dT)-4O and<O if T1<T<L (3.5.1) 
which implies early retirement. 
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This result has to be slightly modified in the money purchase 
case since it will be recalled that it has been assumed that, in a 
large number of cases, YFT<O. The induced early retirement will lead 
to the individual investing more in the private pension fund. 
Complementarity between the state and private pension is a result that 
might not have been expected but is fairly readily understood. 
Retirement is financed out of both state and private pensions. An 
increase in state pensions does not directly affect the size of the 
pension fund since, from (3.4.2) 
YFP =0 (3.5.2) 
but the retirement period is lengthened and it is this which requires 
a larger private pension fund. 
An increase in the terminal salary benefit function, ß(. ), 
will also raise lifetime income and the resulting decrease in work 
period savings will be reinforced due to optimal retirement adjustment. 
The direction of this adjustment, from (3.3.3) is 
L 
Yß, ß = 
(d/dß) Y` (T) R (t) dt -w (T) R (T) 
T 
=1 (d/dß) ß' (T) W (T) + w" (T) R (t) dt -w (T) R (T) (3.5.3) 
lf L 
T 
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. If the analysis is 
confined to the case of a falling wage stream and the benefit function 
increasing by a constant absolute amount for all T, then YTß<O. 
Early retirement is again the outcome. - 
8i 
Similarly, from (3.4.3) and (3.4.4) an increase in the 
function P(. ) changes the size of the pension fund and the retirement 
date according to 
(L 
YFP = (d/dP) PF1 R(t) dt (3.5.4) 
T 
T P= 
/d[TJT R(t) dt - P(F, T) R(T) (3.5.5) 
Again assume P(. ) is increased by a constant absolute amount. Lifetime 
income is raised and work period savings falls. YFP O but YTP<O - as 
YFT<O early retirement leads to more money being transferred into the 
pension fund. Although this is the outcome that might have been 
expected, since the pension investment has been made attractive relative 
to bonds, this model explains the result only in terms of the longer 
retirement period. As with the case of an increase in ß(. ) if the 
simplified assumption about the nature of the change in the function is 
modified, say to multiplication by a scalar, the effects on savings will 
be ambiguous. 
Lastly, an increase in the private pension contribution, a, 
in the terminal salary case will reduce lifetime income and work period 
savings. From (3.3.3) 
YTa = -' (T) (T) <O (3.5.6) 
points to early retirement. With y (T)<O this leads to the individual 
retiring with a higher private pension and a higher lifetime income. 
Consumption is higher in every period whilst income in the work period 
is unchanged. The earlier savings changes are therefore confirmed. 
Less obviously this will also be the case if yo(T)>O since even though 
the individual retires with a lower pension lifetime income cannot fall. 
Y3 
3.6 UNCERTAIN LIFETIME5 
In Section 3.3 some rather forced and contrived assumptions were 
adopted which led to people investing in the money purchase pension 
fund. These assumptions can be relaxed once it is realised that one 
of the most important reasons individuals make a pension arrangement 
is to provide protection against unanticipated longevity. To 
incorporate this motive into the analysis will require modification 
to both the portfolio choice and accumulation aspects of the problem. 
Consider firstly the portfolio problem. 
The assumption that the individual transfers money from 
other forms of capital to the pension fund on retirement will be 
maintained. In addition it will be assumed that the individual will 
live with certainty to T1 but is unsure as to when he will die 
thereafter. The maximum length of life will be denoted L. Uncertainty 
takes the form of a probability density function 'r(. ) on 
{T11 
UJ where 
7r (t) >O for all t3T1 (3.6.1) 
(L 
and J Tr (t) dt =1 (3.6.2) 
T1 
The corresponding probability distribution is 
(L 
cut) =J 7r (t) dT (3.6.3) 
t 
which is the probability that the individual will be alive at-time t. 
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To draw any conclusions in this section it is necessary to 
draw heavily on a paper by Yaari (61) which demonstrates that the 
uncertain lifetime case is considerably simplified by the introduction 
of a perfect insurance market in the form of a market in actuarial 
notes paying out a rate of interest i(t). 
6 
Yaari shows that if i(t) 
is an 'actuarilly fair' rate of interest then 
i(t) r(t) - 
[(t)/(t)J 
> r(t) (3.6.4) 
(3.6.4) defines the rate of return as non-pension assets over 
[OIL). 
Beyond T1 the individual will hold capital only in the form of these 
7 
notes., 
As in the previous sections the individuals problem is to 
choose F and T to maximise Y(F, T) and although the qualitative solutions 
go through unhindered they will be quantitatively different for two 
reasons. The first is that in Figure 3.4.1 the shape of the g(T) 
function has been changed due to the higher rate of interest after T1. 
Thus the substitution of all the optimal values of F and T that 
satisfy the first and second order conditions into (3.4.1) may yield 
a different optimum to that in the certainty case. Secondly it has 
not been assumed that L in the certainty case is the same as, L in 
the uncertainty case. 
The effect of uncertainty on accumulation is analysed by 
introducing L as a random variable into (2.2.1). This raises a 
problem in that if L is 
,a 
random variable then so is the intertemporal 
utility function. Utility-maximisation is now rather imprecise.,, It 
is therefore necessary to assume that the individual maximises expected 
_ _95 
utility. The only problem remaining is that the terminal wealth 
constraint, (2.2.3) is probabilistic. Yaari presents two rather 
attractive ways around this problem, the chance constrained 
programming and loss function approaches. The former will be 
described in detail. 
8 
The chance constrained programming approach requires that 
the wealth constraint is met with a probability of at least. 
Thus (2.2.3) can be replaced by 
prob 
(kLo) 
>. ir (3.6.5) 
If an admissable plan is defined as one for which 7=1 the optimal 
plan can then be determined. 
The expected utility function is 
J (t) 
EU = 0(t) u(c(t)) e- dt 
0 
which is maximised subject to 
k(t) = i(t)k(t) + y(t) - c(t) 
and k (L) 
(3.6.6) 
(3.6.7) 
(3.6.8) 
Applying the-calculus of variations Yaari shows that the solution to 
this problem is 
c(t)/c(t) = 
[1(t) 
- 6(t) + 
SZ(t)/ät(t)J/8 (3.6.9) 
This is formally similar to (2.2.17) - in this case consumption-is 
growing over time if i(t)>6(t) - 
SZ (t)/(t). From (3.6.4) it becomes 
clear that not only are (2.2.17) and (3.6.9) formally similar, they are 
identical. This, of course, only applies to consumption over 
(0, 
LI. 
g6 
The introduction of the perfect insurance market reduces the 
uncertainty problem to that under certainty. 
(3.6.9) is also significant in that it implies that the 
earlier comparative statics outcomes are unchanged since the effects 
of changes in p and NO on consumption in every period is determined 
from 
(L (1 
C= Y(F, T) = c0J expli(t) - S(t) + SZ(t)/f1(t)/0 dt (3.6.10) 
0l 
which is handled in exactly the same way as (2.4.2). 
To simplify'the uncertainty problem to the extent that has been 
achieved it has been necessary to assume-the existence of the perfect 
insurance market. This means that there are three assets in the model, 
bonds, actuarial notes and the pension - the latter though is clearly 
inessential since if there are perfect insurance markets then additional 
insurance in the form of pensions is not needed. The actuarial notes 
act as the pension asset. 
In a recent paper Ulph and Hemming (59) have considered the 
problem when insurance markets are less complete than assumed by Yaari. 
Whilst the analysis'of the consumers portfolio and accumulation 
problem turns out to substantially more complicated most of the 
comparative statics results arrived at in the earlier part of this 
chapter are confirmed. The one major difference is that whilst 
changes in the state pension had no effect on the optimal choice of 
the retirement' date if this occurred before T1 this result is now 
changed. In the more complex model a rise'in the state pension leads 
to the postponement of retirement since it induces the individual to 
c7 
run down private pension income thus making retirement less attractive. 
To fully understand this result one would have to outline the analysis 
of the paper in considerable detail - this is not thought to be 
worthwhile given the implications of the analysis for these results. 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter the model developed in Chapter 2 has been modified to 
include private pension schemes. It has been shown that 
i) The effect on savings of the introduction the schemes 
described cannot be determined, a priori. 
ii) The effect of increasing the state pension, the functions 
determining private pension income by a constant absolute amount, and 
the private pension contributions all induce early retirement and lead 
to a reduction in work period and therefore aggregate savings. An 
increase in the function determining private pension with the money 
purchase scheme leads to a larger fund as does an increase in the state 
pension scheme. 
iii) Uncertainty about the length of life has been included 
in the model, albeit in a highly stylised form, with perfect 
insurance markets which reduce the problem to one of portfolio choice 
and accumulation under certainty. Now typically one does not observe 
people trading continuously in actuarial notes. A model in which 
insurance-markets-are not complete has been analysed, and found to be 
tractable, in the paper by Ulph and Hemming. Had this paper been 
available earlier it would clearly have provided a more realistic 
framework in which to present the analyses and obtain nearly all of 
the results of sections 3.4,3.5 and 3.6. 
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NOTES 
1. This is an expanded version of Hemming (29). 
2. These are handled in exactly the same way as in Chapter 2. 
3. This section draws heavily on Sections 1 and 2 of Hemming 
and Ulph (30). 
4. With the money purchase scheme there is a problem with comparative 
statics analysis since changing pension parameter could shift the 
global maximum from one local maximum to another (see Figure 3.4.1). 
It is assumed that all comparative statics analysis is carried 
out at a local level. 
5. Again this section draws heavily on Hemming and Ulph (30), 
Section 3. 
6. If the consumer buys such a note he will have an asset which pays 
out interest at a rate i(t) for as long as he lives, but such 
will have no value of his death. Similarly, if the consumer sells 
such a note he will have to pay out interest i(t) as, long as he 
lives, but on death the debt is cancelled. 
7. From what has been said the individual can clearly satisfy his 
terminal constant by always holding actuarial notes. Also there 
is no apparent limit to lifetime wealth since notes can always be 
sold and the interest payments financed by selling more notes. 
To avoid this problem Yaari defines a date L-A by which time the 
S5 
individual has to have no debt. Over the last L-A years of 
life the insurance company will not sell notes and this 
constrains individual behaviour in that there is a positive 
probability that he will be alive over this period. 
8. This approach assumes that the violation of the wealth constraint 
carries a penalty in the form of a reduction in utility. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ESTIMATION : PROBLEMS AND METHODS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
To estimate the relationship between pensions and savings Feldstein's 
approach will be followed, and pension wealth variables will be 
introduced into the Modigliani-Brumberg-Ando (M-B-A) formulation of 
the consumption function. 
The only guide to the exact form of the consumption function, 
under the assumption of perfect certainty, is given by (2.4.2. ), 
(2.4.3. ) and (2.4.4. ) which show that consumption in each period is 
related to lifetime income in the following way 
Ct exp 
ö(r(T)-ö(T))/6dT 
Y(T) (4.1.1. ) 
11L 
expL(r(t)-S(t))/A}dt 
It can be seen that the proportion of lifetime income consumed in 
each period depends on the functions r(. ) and d(. ), age and the form 
of the utility function, as given by 0. Beyond this though little can 
be learnt, particularly about the relationship between consumption 
and resources in each period. It is fortunate then that the analysis 
is not constrained by (4.1.1. ). Indeed, as shown in Hemming (29), 
the theoretical analysis of the previous two chapters is independent 
of the analysis of the individual's intertemporal utility maximisation 
problems. All the results go through if it is assumed that the inter- 
temporal utility function 'depends only on the intertemporal consump- 
tion stream. In addition, utility has to be an increasing function 
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of consumption expenditure in any one period and consumption 
expenditure in each period a normal good, increasing as total 
lifetime income increases. 
Even the relaxation of this assumption does not facilitate 
the a priori specification of the mathematical form of the consumption 
function. In particular there is no reason to believe the relationship 
is linear. A linear specification will therefore be compared with 
some linear transformations of non-linear specifications, chosen 
for their properties relating to theoretical consumption functions! 
The following relationships will be estimated 
i) linear: Y=a+ ßX : constant marginal propensity 
to consume; 
ii) semi-logarithmic: logy =a+ ßX : increasing marginal 
propensity to consume; 
iii) double-logarithmic: logY =a+ ßlogX : diminishing 
marginal propensity to consume if 0<ß<l. 
iv) log-reciprocal: logY = a-ß/x : increasing then diminishing 
marginal propensity to consume. 
The specification giving the best overall 
fit will be retained. 
4.2 WEALTH IN THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 
Before proceeding to introduce pension wealth variables into the 
consumption function it is worth while reviewing the evidence, in 
addition to that of Feldstein already presented, relating to the role 
of wealth in determining the level of consumers' expenditure. 
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Prior to the recently published survey by Mayer (43) the 
role of wealth as a determinant of consumers' expenditure had only 
been reviewed in detail by Evans (18). He considered the papers by 
Spiro (55), Ando and Modigliani (2)) and Ball and Drake (10). 
Spiro suggests that the level of savings is a function of 
the discrepancy between actual and desired wealth. If desired wealth 
is a function of the level of income one can write 
Ct ¢ f(Wt, Yt, Yt-1' ...., Yt-00). (4.2.1. ) 
which , xi3xPfGiRtnigeweelitIiniiieted: em! jfoknriic'o'meniiirfyVy6ugeperiodsý `can 
be written 
i=c 
Ct 
io 
Yb-i (4.2.2. ) 
Spiro requires that the coefficients on previous income sum to unity 
which can be guaranteed if one writes ßii= (1-b)bi. The final 
consumption function is 
i=00 
Ct = (1-b) 
iE 
b Yt-i (4.2.3. ) 
=0 
Ando and Modigliani follow Modigliani and Brumberg (46) in 
assuming that individuals maximise a lifetime utility function, 
defined over present and future consumption, subject to the constraint 
that lifetime consumption cannot exceed lifetime resources. Lifetime 
resources are defined as the sum of current earnings, future earnings 
and current net worth. This is perfectly consistent with the 
maximisation of (2.2.8. ) subject to (2.2.9. ) and(2.2.10. 
). The 
authors then introduce the specific assumption that the utility 
function is such that the proportion of total resources devoted to 
consumption in any year is independent of the size of 
lifetime 
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resources. Any increase in lifetime resources will be allocated 
between present and future consumption in the same proportion as 
existing resources. This proportion depends on the rate of interest, 
2 
the rate of discount, age and the form of the utility function. 
c= 0t v (4.2.4. ) 
where Va = Wa + Ya += YepL /(1+r)T-a (4.2.5. ) t t-1 t T=a+1 T 
where Ye is expected earnings. Defining average annual expected 
earnings as 
T 
Yea = (1/T-a) E Yea/(l+r)T-a (4.2.6. ) 
T=a+l T 
and using (4.2.4. ) and (4.2.5. ) one can write 
Ct = Sit Ya + ,a (T-a) Yta + na Wt-1 (4.2.7. ) 
For ease of exposition it is often assumed that 0t = 1/(L-a) and the 
optimal consumption stream is constant3. Aggregating (4.2.7. ) within 
and over age cohorts produces the consumption function for the whole 
community 
Ct = ß1Yt + ß2Yt + ß3Wt-1 (4.2.8. ) 
Ball and Drake hypothesise that individual behaviour is 
myopic and the utility function to be maximised is of the form 
Ut =f (Wt, ct) (4.2.9. ) 
which is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 1. Maximising this 
function subject to the constraint 
Wt - Wt-l+Yt. -ct (4.2.10. ) 
9Lf 
yields the consumption function 
Ct = KWt (4.2.11. ) 
which on substituting into the budget constra. nti'i'es 
Ct = (1/1+K) Yt + (K/1+K) Ct_1 (4.2.12. ) 
All these authors would descibe the results of their own 
tests as 'good'. These results though have all been challenged by 
Evans, who re-estimates all the functions using annual U. S. data for 
the periods 1929-41 and 1947-62 and quarterly data for the period 
1947-62. Specifically his criticisms are: 
a) Spiro deflates income by a GNP deflator when a consumers' 
price index would be more appropriate. Evans shows that the use of a 
GNP deflator biasses the sum of income coefficients towards unity. 
b) Of the Ball and Drake estimates Evans shows that they do 
not hold when income growth is introduced into their consumption 
function: In particular a realistic growth rate produces an unrealist 
marginal propensity to consume. 
c) Although Evans was able to confirm that the fit of the 
Ando-Modigliani function was fairly good using annual data, with post 
war quarterly data it performs particularly badly. This result suggests 
that wealth is more important in times of depression. 
9s 
Thus Evans concludes 
".... the time series evidence gives very little 
reason to believe that wealth should be included 
in the consumption function, either implicitly 
or explicitly. " (p. 349) 
Mayer partially confirms these results by showing that for the period 
1962-67, using data, for the post-war period, only the Ball and Drake 
function could predict the level of consumption better than a naive 
model which suggests that consumption grows at a constant rate (either 
0% or 3%). 
These findings do not bode well for the analysis to follow, 
but subsequent work, which suggests extending the definition of 
wealth, appears to leave some hope. Arena (3)) argues that if one were 
to include increments of net worth, due to savings and interest, in 
the consumption function then one ought to include changes in its 
value due to price movements. Omitting expected income from the 
Ando-Modigliani model but adding in capital gains, and the lag 
distribution of all variables, Arena's results supported a wealth 
model. Bhat$a (11) modifies Arena's model by allowing income and 
capital gains to influence consumption with different geometric lags. 
Unfortunately Bhatra omits wealth from his function. 
The approach of Arena and Bhatia has been modified by 
Feldstein (21) and Feldstein and Fane (22), who argue that the 
components of net worth might affect consumption to differing degrees. 
In addition to net worth, as previously defined, the authors consider 
the effect of including capital gains, dividends and retained earnings 
of companies in the consumption function. The marginal propensities 
to consume out of these components are likely to be different for 
9, 
two reasons. Firstly, investors are likely to view retained earnings 
as a more permanent increase in wealth than market revaluations of 
wealth due to price changes. It is also the case that tax policies in 
the U. K. and U. S., where the tax rates on retained earnings are below 
those on dividends, induce companies to retain income rather than 
distribute it. If changes in retained earnings are tax induced then 
they might be regarded as good predictors of future changes in 
retained earnings. Secondly, these components of wealth might react 
in different ways with savings, subsequent to changes in the rate of 
interest. Changes in interest rates affect both the value of wealth 
and the allocation of consumption over the lifecycle. It is well 
known that the net effect on consumption is ambiguous and it follows 
that the coefficient on retained earnings can be increased or-decreased 
relative to that on capital gains. 
Thus a 'components of capital gains model of the capital 
income hypothesis', which states that all forms of capital-income, 
whether distributed or not, have a substantial impact on concurrent 
consumption, has to be tested. 
Feldstein proceeds by writing capital gains as the sum of 
changes in net worth dud to retained earnings and changes in the 
market value of assets 
Gt = tREt + Xt 
. 
t<1 (4.2.13 .) 
As $ cannot be observed the consumption function has to be written 
in the form 
Ct=a+ aý + ý1Xt + Pt-1 + ß3Gt + "ß4REt 
(4'. 2.14. ) 
where ß4 represents the excess effect on consumption of retained 
earnings over capital gains in general. 
9) 
Using U. S. data for the period 1929-66 Feldstein' estimates 
a series of equations all of which support the conclusion that the 
impact of retained earnings is fairly considerable. The coefficients 
on capital gAils and net worth are not significantly different4. 
Feldstein and Fane use U. K. data for the period 1948-69. 
The specification of the consumption function is altered to allow a 
dynamic lag pattern. Thegrsugga5toaniequation of the form 
Ct a+ ß 
(, _, )r rY+ßW+ßG+ß RE ` (4.2.15. ) t 0(1-XL) t1 t-1 2t3t 
where L is a lag operator such that LkYt = Yt-k and r`is the order of 
the Pascal lag. 
The estimated equations suggest that the coefficient on 
retained earnings is approximately +. 25 and again the coefficients on 
net worth and capital gains are not significantly different5. Redefining 
income to exclude dividends and including dividends explicitly in the 
consumption function did not change the implications of the analysis. 
In addition, attempts to estimate separate lag distributions for the 
for the components of capital gains proved fruitless. 
Overall Feldstein and Fane conclude 
"Our evidence supports the capital income hypothesis: 
capital income, including retained earnings as well as 
dividends, has a substantial effect on concurrent 
consumption. More specifically the estimates favour the 
components of capital gains model. " (p. 410). 
The next stage in reviewing the role of wealth in the consump- 
tion function would be to examine pension wealth. This has already 
been carried out in'Chapterv1 Section 4 and it should now be clear 
that Feldstein (19) is a modification of Feldstein (21) to include 
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pension wealth. A modification of Feldstein (22) to include pension 
wealth will be included in Section 5 of this chapter. But before doing 
this another problem has to be tackled - that of 'estimating' expected 
income. 
4.3 THE ESTIMATION OF EXPECTED INCOME 
It can be seen from (4.2.8. ) that the aggregate consumption function 
contains a variable 'average annual expected income' which is 
unobservable. From (4. Z. 14. ) and footnote 4 it can be seen that 
Feldstein includes disposable income lagged one period to reflect 
expected income - the reasoning for this is normally that recent 
income experience is a good guide to future income changes. On the 
other hand (4.2.15. ) implies that expected income is represented by 
an infinite lag on disposable income - the rationale here is that the 
complete income experience is important in determining expected income. 
To learn a little more about this problem it is probably best 
to start with the way it was tackled by Ando and Modigliani (2). In 
this paper the income variables always refer to current non property 
income. Three methods of measuring expected income were suggested. 
i) naive hypothesis: it is assumed that expected income is 
current income multiplied by a scale factor. Then 
Yt = YYt 
Thus the relationship between consumption and income variables is 
written 
Ct = aIYt where ßI = ßC + ßly (4.3.2. ) 
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ii) exponentially weighted average of past incomes: this 
method was not used by the authors because of lack of data. It is 
to be discussed later in this section. 
iii) cyclical weights: it is hypothesised that for those 
currently employed average expected income is 
Yt = (Y1/Et) Yt (4.3.3. ) 
where Et is the number of people engaged in production. For those 
unemployed 
Yt, _ (y2/Et) Yt yl>y2 
Multiplying (4.3.3. ) and (4.3.4. ) by`the numbers employed and 
unemployed (Lt -- Et where Lt is the total labour force) yields 
Yt =(Y1-Y2 Y2) Yt + Y2 (Lt/Et) Yt (4.3.5. ) 
The relationship between consumption and income variables is therefore 
written 
Ct = alYt + a2 (Lt/Et) Yt (4.3.6. ) 
where al = ß0 + ß1(Y1-Y2) 
and a2 = ß1Y2 
This discussion raises two points. Consider firstly the 
definition of income. Although Ando and Modigliani are concerned with 
labour income estimates are arrived at using personal disposable 
income due to the difficulties involved in measuring labour income. 
Feldstein and Fane (p. 402) quite correctly point out that although 
I00 
Ando and Modigliani think this procedure is perfectly in accord with 
their original theory it will have different implications for the 
marginal propensity to consume6. Nevertheless it does go a long way 
towards explaining the use of disposable income in the research 
reviewed. 
Turning now to the lag specification. Ando and Modigliani 
have possibly suggested two very different procedures. Methods i) 
and iii) are really very similar in that iii) can be interpreted 
simply as saying that expected income is proportional to the average 
current income of those employed. What the two specifications have in 
common is that they are both theoretical. The exponential weighting 
method, ii), can be both a theoretical and empirical specification and 
in discounting it, Ando and Modigliani do not make it clear which they 
think it is. It is probably fair to say though that in referring to 
Friedman (23) they believe the data should determine the length of 
any lag and the specification is therefore empirical. 
To consider this distinction in more detail consider. the 
problem of empirically estimating lags - this can be done using three 
popular methods. 
The principle being considered is that consumption is a 
function of not only current but also expected income. Income expec- 
tations are reflected in previous income experience and the problem 
is to determine how far in the past income experience becomes 
irrelevant. 
Consider then a finite lag structure, of the-form 
Ct =a+ Yt + a1Xt-1 + .... +0 kYt-k + ut 
(4.3.6. ) 
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If one can make the usual assumptions about the error term i. e. 
E(ut) = 0, E(ut, ut+J )=0 for j it 0 and a2 for j=0 then, one can 
proceed and estimate this equation using ordinary least square (OLS). 
Unfortunately this method nearly always involves two problems. With 
time series data over a relatively short period and a large number of 
lags sampling variances are inevitably large, coefficients tend to be 
erratic and tests of the significance of parameters are impaired. 
Secondly successive values of income will be highly multicollinear, 
and variables which are insignificant will appear significant and 
vice versa. 
Attempts to estimate OLS lags using recent U. K. data? are 
presented in Table 4.3.1. The main features of these results are that 
the lag is quite short the first year always having about three 
quarters of the weight and many of the coefficients are negative and 
marginally significant which has little economic meaning. 
Given these results the procedure is very clear - one has 
to achieve both a reduction in the number of lagged variables and 
constrain the coefficients. 0 
Ando and Modigliani suggest using Friedman's method of 
constraining the coefficients by imposing on the data an exponentially 
declining pattern of weights. Omitting the constant term, this is written 
Ct = ß0 
g0 x Yt-i + ut XE(O, 1) 
It has also been suggested that the weights ought to add up to 1 or 
slightly more than 1 if an allowance is to be made for income growth 
through time. As EX = 1/(l-X) 01 for (ABO) the lag pattern is 
normalised to reflect Z (l-, ) Xi = (l-a)/ (1--X) = 1. Föl1owing-`Friedman ; 
and allowing for incomeZ'growth=atra rate g, (4.3.7. ) becomes 
101 
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Ct = ß0 (1-X) ii=k 
ý0 Al (1+g) Yt-i + ti 
t 
02A<1 (4.3.8. ) 
Using the U. K. data (4.3.8. ) ha's been estimated - the 
value of k being dictated, for each value of A, by that value of 
(1-X)X' which falls below 1%8. This implies that E(1-A)X will 
normally be less than 1, the difference between the two being greater 
the lower the value of X. 
The results in Table 4.3.2. are based on an assumed income 
growth rate of 2%. Of the values chosen for A it can be seen that 
equations both with and without constants have improved goodness of 
fits as A decreases indicating an extremely short lag. 
Lastly consider the polynomial', lag method as proposed by 
Almon (1)) and popularised by Jorgenson (34). The method is to 
assume that the ß coefficients in (4. a. 6. ) can be approximated by a 
polynomial function of the rth degree. For r=2 the results of 
fitting a polynomial function to the U. K. data are given in Table 
4.3.3. Again it can be seen that the lag is short. In the best 
fitting equations about 75% of the weight is attached to the first 
year's income. As with the OLS regressions the fact that the co- 
efficients are not constrained means that a number 'misbehave', 
particularly with the later values of lagged variables. 
Applying these three methods to the U. S. data Mayer (43) 
produced very similar results - this would appear to justify Feldstein's 
(19). (21) specification of expected income using-simply a one period 
lag_on disposable income. 
Having concluded that the empirical lag is short one should 
now ask what value one can put on this. In particular Griliches_ (27) 
has outlined the problems involved in estimating lags in autocorrelated 
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series and one of his conclusions was 
"... do not expect the data to give a clear cut 
answer about the exact form of the lag. The world 
is not that benevolent. One should try to get more 
implications from theory about the correct form of 
the lag and impose it on the data. " (p. 46. ). 
The theory outlined in the previous chapters cannot help in 
determining the lag. Nevertheless it is fairly reasonable to suggest 
that, if one is going to assume that previous income experience is a 
good guide to income expectations, the weight one puts on successive 
lagged values of income is declining. It is probably less reasonable, 
though still plausible, to suggest the weights decline geometrically. 
Thus a lag pattern similar to (4.3.7. ) can be adopted. A problem still 
arises in that there is no reason to believe that the lag is of any 
particular length. Alpopular solution is to assume that it is infinite. 
Attention will now be focussed on'this case. 
4.4 THE THEORETICAL INFINITE LAG : THE KOYCK SCHEME 
With an'infinite geometric lag (4.3.7. ) will become 
Ct =ßC(1^a) ijO , 
ý, " ý't-i ± ut (4.4.1. ) 
which can be written in the lag-operator form 
Ct = ß0 (1-A) Yt + ut (4.4.2. ) 
(1-AL) 
yielding, on inversion, 
Ct = Bo(1-a) Yt + AC t^1 + 
(ut - Xut-1) (4.4.3. ) 
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This model has been popularised by Koyck (36) and has been 
generalised by Solow (54) so that the lag structure becomes (1-x)rAi - 
this is the Pascal lag used by Feldstein and Fane. It can be seen 
that when r=1 this reduces to the geometric lag scheme, whilst r>1 
guarantees that the lag structure peaks. 
This formulation generally raises four types of problem. 
Firstly the lagged dependent variable, Ct_1, is not independent of the 
error term ut = ut - Xut-1 which implies small sample bias in OLS 
estimates. Secondly the error term is serially correlated. These two 
problems put together imply that OLS estimates will be inconsistent 
and inefficient in large samples and that the power of the Durbin 
Watson statistic to detect serial correlation is seriously impaired. 
There are two ways to proceed from here. One can either go 
back to examine the theoretical justification for an equation like 
(4.4.3. ) or tackle the estimation problems directly. From a theoretical 
viewpoint two popular models can result in this type of equation. 
Cagan's (14) adaptive-expectations hypothesis would suggest that 
consumption is a function of the expected level of income, Yt, and 
that expectations are formed in each period by updating by a fraction 
the difference between this period's current income and the previous 
period's expected income. This yields two equations 
Ct = ýY* + ut (4.4.4. ) 
Yt - Yt-1 = d(Yt - Yt-1) o<o<1 (4.4.5. ) 
which setting 1-6 =X can be written 
Ct = B0(1-a)Yt +A Ct-1 + (ut - auf=') (4.4.6. ) 
which is identical to (4.4.3. ) 
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Nerlove's (47) partial adjustment hypothesis suggests that 
for a given income level the individual will have an optimal level of 
consumption, Ct, but because income is changing over time and the 
individual does not have the information, ability-or inclination he 
will not adjust fully to the new optimal consumption level from period 
to period. Formally 
Ct 
0t 
(4.4.7. ) 
Ct-Ct-1=SýCt-Ct-1) +ut 0<S: Y X4.4.8. ) 
which again setting 1- S=X implies 
Ct = ß0 (1-X)Yt + xct-1 + ut (4.4.9. ) 
which is this time similar to (4.4.3. ) except that the serial cor- 
relation in the error term is no longer present. The parameters of the 
model can therefore be estimated consistently using OLS. 
Before suggesting that invoking the partial adjustment 
hypothesis circumvents all the estimation problems it is worth 
considering the implications of the model. The crucial point is ought 
the desired level of consumption to depend only on current income 
when it is known that income is changing through time. Maybe Johnston 
(33) is correct in his suggestion that in such a situation it is more 
logical to base consumption decisions on expected income9 - this leads 
one back to an adaptive expectations model as a logical development of 
a partial adjustment model. 
With specific reference to this analysis. it is also clear that 
a partial adjustment model is generally inapplicable when considering 
the problem of approximating expected income, although there is no 
log 
reason why the partial adjustment could not be made with respect to 
changes in expected income. I 
As regards the estimation of these models most econometrics 
textbooks refer to the paper by Zellner and Geisel (62) who investigate 
the importance of misspecifying the error term. They consider four 
error term specifications; 
i) u's are N(O, a2) : E(vi, v. ) =0 which says that the 
error term is not serially correlated 
ii) u's are - N(O, Qü 
iii) ut = put-1 + Et : e's are - N(O, a2) E(si, c)=O 
which says that the u's follow a first order Markov process. Note 
that p=A implies i) and p=0 implies ii). 
iv) vt = Tut-1 + wt : w's are - N(O, a2) : E(wi, W') = O. 
This can be rewritten ut - ut-1 = $(ut-1 Xut-2) + Wt which says that 
the true disturbance term can be approximated by a first order auto- 
regressive process. Note that if '( = 0, iv) reduces to i). 
Using each of these specifications Zellner and Geisel 
calculate maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of (4.4.3. ), 
having discussed the estimation problems pertaining to each one. These 
results are summarised in Table 4.4.1. The lessons to be learnt from 
the results have two sides. It is clear that the specification of the 
error term is important in that it does affect the estimated parameters, 
particularly the lag parameter, X. On the other hand, $0, the long run 
marginal propensity to consume, is insensitive to the error specification 
and the sum of the lag coefficient and the short run marginal propensity 
to consume is remarkably stable. Analysis of the model under assumption 
iii) suggests that u's are serially correlated but A^p in which case 
iii) reduces to i). Using assumption iv) the estimated value of '1` is 
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close to zero in which case this model reduces to i). In addition a 
Bayesian analysis suggested that assumption i) was a preferred 
specification to ii). 
Despite the fact that it is difficult to justify in terms of 
economic theory, this analysis suggests that the risk involved in making 
the simplest assumption is not great. A model will therefore be considered 
where the composite error term vt is not serially correlated. It should 
be emphasised though that this assumption is being made'not because it 
is believed to be true but because the preceding discussion suggests 
that one does not need to be too careful in specifying the error pattern. 
Serially correlated error terms aside there still remains the 
issue of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and'the 
error term. To consider the problems raised by this it might be con- 
venient to consider the full model to be estimated. 
4.5 -THE FULL MODEL 
A pension wealth variable is to be introduced into an"aggregate life 
cycle consumption function where expected income is approximated by an 
infinite geometrically declining lag on previous periods' income. In 
lag operator forme' reintroducing the constant term, -this is written 
Ct=a+ß"(1=a) Yt+ßlWt-1+ß? 't+ut (4.5.1. ) 
where. PWt is the value of pension wealth defined in the way described 
by Feldstein (19). By inversion this becomes 
IIl 
Ct = (1-ý)a + ßC(1-A)Yt + AC t-1 + 
a2Wt-1 - a2XWt-2 
+ ß2PWt $2x wt-1 + (ut - Xut-1) (4.5.2. ) 
This is remarkably similar to the inversion of (2.4.15. ) and, in the 
absence of serial correlation in the error term, Feldstein and Fane 
point out an additional estimation difficulty, in that (4.5.2. ) has 
more coefficients than basic parameters, which are therefore over- 
identified. As mentioned earlier, OLS will yield biassed estimates 
with small samples, owing to the presence of the lagged dependent 
variable. An accepted procedure-with models of this type is to apply 
instrumental variables estimation procedures, following the suggestion 
of Leviatan, (40) and using lagged values of other explanatory variables 
as instruments. This though does not solve the problem of biassedness 
in small samples - it is used to its greatest advantage when the error 
term is serially correlated as it restores the asymptotic properties of 
the estimators.. The problem of overidentification is alleviated by 
imposing restrictions on the coefficients X, 0l and 02 in (4.5.2. ) and 
minimising the sum of squared residuals with-respect to the values 
chosen. --- 
This is the method suggested by Feldstein and Fane who refer 
to it as 'constrained instrumental variables' estimation. 
The problem with this method-is-that, in searching across I 
three parameters, the procedures are likely to be computationally time 
consuming and-therefore expensive. 
Thus there are two problems to overcome -. small sample bias: 
and computational complexity.. A convenient way around the estimation 
problem is to rearrange (4.5.2. ) such that one has a transformed equation 
"3 
Ct = a' +ß Yt + ON-1 + 02PWt + vt (4.5.3. ) 
where-C = Ct - Act-1 
Wt-1 - Wt-1 Wt-2 
PWt = PWt XPWt-1 
a' = (1-X) a 
ßý _ (1-A) ß0 
Ut = ut -. Aut-1 -N (O, 0'Ü) :E (v , v. ) = O. 
This is then estimated by OLS searching only over values of X- these 
will be generalised least squares (GLS) estimates. Overidentification 
is no longer a problem, there is no lagged dependent variable and only 
one variable is involved in the search procedure. The cost incurred is 
that there will not be separate standard errors for X, a and ß0. 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has reviewed some of the problems involved in estimating 
consumption functions based on a life cycle hypothesis of consumer 
decision making. The main conclusions are 
i) In the absence of any a priori information as to the form 
of the consumption function a number of mathematical forms will be 
estimated. If the non linear specifications do not perform any better 
than the linear form it will be assumed that the relationship is linear. 
ii) Although Evans argued that there seemed little justification 
for including wealth in the consumption function more recent research 
has suggested that an extension of the definition of wealth to include 
4- 
both the components of capital gains and pension wealth is worth while. 
iii) The approximation of expected income by a distributed lag 
on past income values can be achieved using both empirical and theoreti- 
cal methods. The empirical estimation of the lag suggests that its 
mean length is extremely short. One of the models tested will therefore 
represent expected income by a one period lag on disposable income. 
Two theoretical lag structures will also be considered. The first will 
be the simplest form suggested by MBA where only current income is in- 
cluded in the estimated equation. In addition the transformed version 
of model incorporating an infinite geometrically declining lag structure, 
as given by (4.6.3. ) will be estimated. 
ºº5 
NOTES 
1. This procedure is suggested by Houthakker and Taylor (31) p. 8. 
2. In the spirit of M-B-A assume that the individual neither receives 
nor leaves any bequest. Using the earlier notation this will give 
k(L) = 
Jy(t) 
exp 
(-ft 
exp r(T))dt - c0JL exp(r(t)-6(t))/0 dt =0 
Define normal income as the constant income v0 the discounted 
present value of which is equal to the discounted present value of 
lifetime income. This will give 
v0J 
L 
exp '(-ft exp r (t) dT) dt = co JL exp 
(r (t) -S (t)) /O dt 
which solving for c0 yields 
Co = XV0 
where X is fixed and depends on r("), s(") and the form of the 
utility function (see Modigliani and Brumberg (46) p. 346) . 
3. From (4.1.1. ) it can be seen that the'rate at which lifetime 
resources are consumed depends on age. The special case will be 
achieved where r(t) = 6(t) in which case consumption is equal to 
C(t) _ (1/L)Y(T). 
iii 
4. A typical result is 
Ct = 41 + . 57 Yd + . 18 Ya-1 + . 024 Wt-1 - . 12 Gt 
(. 06) (. 04) 
+ . 49 REt + 2.99 Ut 
(. 10) (. 89) 
(. 008) (2.21) 
DW = 2.03 
SSR = 2209 
where REt is defined net of depreciation and the unemployment 
rate Ut is included to guard against the estimated effect of 
retained earnings being biassed by spurious correlation with 
cyclical conditions. 
5. A typical result is 
Ct = 17.8 + . 77 . 55 
1-. 45L 
(5.6) (. 02) 
+ . 017 wt-1 
(. 008) 
Yt + . 019 Gt + . 254 REt 
(. 007) (. 127) 
SSR = 65.66 
6. Recent literature reviews (i. e. Timbrell (57)) completely ignore 
this problem. 
0 
7. The data used are Blue Book estimates of disposable income and 
consumers' expenditure. These are deflated by a price index of 
consumer goods and services and adjusted for population changes. 
A major weakness of the results is that they include data for the 
years 1939-45 - thus some of the long lags on income at the beginning 
of the sample period depend on data which is unreliable. Neverthe- 
less the problems involved in attempting to justify omitting the 
III 
war years altogether are probably no less than including them. 
8. Friedman (23) included all lags that explained at least . 1% - 
for the purposes of this exercise 1% is thought to be quite 
adequate. 
9. p. 301. 
ºiS 
CHAPTER FIVE 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 4 the methods and problems associated with estimating 
consumption functions including wealth were described and discussed. 
The main empirical findings based on the procedures outlined are now 
to be presented. Before proceeding it should be mentioned that the 
equations contained in this chapter are not the total number estimated. 
Where a slight change in the specification of an estimated equation 
only marginally affects parameter estimates the full equation will not 
normally be reported. 
5.2 THE DATA 
The following variables are included in the regressions-undertaken--, 
the data source appears in brackets after the definition except where 
a detailed description is necessary. 
i) Yt - personal disposable income in year t (National 
Income and Expenditure Blue Book). 
ii) Ct - consumer's expenditure in year t (as (i)). ' 
iii) REt - retained earnings of companies in year t (as (i)). 
iv) Wt - net worth of the personal sector at the end of year't. 
A long series, -from amy one source, does not exist. It was therefore 
necessary to combine the shorter period estimates of Langley (38)(39). 
lt9 
Lydall and Tipping (41), Revell (50) and Inland Revenue Statistics. 
Except for Revell the data refers only to wealth holding in G. B. 
As the Revell data separates out the wealth held by those in Northern 
Ireland it was assumed that the residents of this country always held 
the same average proportion of total wealth as suggested by Revell 
and the other data was uprated accordingly. It was'also fortunate 
that all the short data periods overlapped by one or two years such 
that the consistency of estimates could be examined. Different studies 
were clearly unlikely to give the same estimates for the same year even 
though they were all based on Estate Duty Statistics. The mortality 
multipliers, and exemption limits were all different; To produce a 
consistent series the figures were presented as Inland Revenue equi- 
valents, brought about simply by scaling the other estimates. This 
method essentially assumes that all studies are correct in estimating 
the proportionate changes in total wealth from year to year but only 
the Inland Revenue estimate its total level correctly. 
v) WFt -a measure of Wt used by Feldstein and Fane (22). 
The 1958 figure in Revell's series is used as a benchmark and year to 
year changes in net worth are added and subtracted. These annual incre- 
ments are 
a) savings net of depreciation and the excess of capital 
taxes minus capital transfers 
b) appreciation of fixed assets owned by the personal 
sector 
c) net change in the market value of equities due to their 
price changes 
d) net change in the market value of government bonds due 
to their price changes. 
Sao 
(c) and (d) both exclude new issues. 
vi) SPWt - the discovered present value of, anticipated 
receipts in the form of the flat rate state pension, evaluated at the 
beginning of period t. This includes both the wealth of workers and 
pensioners and is therefore different from Feldstein's measure in 
that he excludes the wealth of pensioners, presumably because the use 
of disposable income in the consumption function includes pension pay- 
ments to those retired. It does seem rather strange though that one 
has a wealth theory of consumption and then does not allow the 
consumer who is not working to run down his wealth, even, if it is in 
the form of a state pension where the rate of depletion is exogenously 
determined. To reconcile this with the use of disposable income is, in 
theory, not difficult. The first argument is that disposable income 
with°or without some form of lag structure is strictly speaking only" 
a proxy-for the discounted present value of expected future net labour 
income in addition to this period's labour income. An alternative 
procedure is to subtract state pension benefits from disposable income. 
The problems involved in doing this are shortly=to be-reviewed. ' 
viii. NPWt - SPWt less the discounted present value of state 
pension contributions. 
An algorithm used to calculate the"values of these two variables and 
the sources of data are described in Appendix I to this chapter. 
A point that ought-to be-discussed at this juncture, is'how 
does one. choose'between'the, two specifications of state pension wealth. 
As pension contributions are included'in disposable income it might be 
argued that the present value of expected contributions is included in 
an expected net income measure based on disposable income. On the-other 
hand personal wealth is normally defined in net worth terms and in the-case 
of pensionsfls this is the individual's accrued right to a pension . 
i. e. 
IAI 
the pension scheme creates for each individual an amount of wealth 
equal to the difference between the present value of anticipated 
benefits and contributions. - With this definition the pension contri- 
bution in period t is included in the present value of contributions 
in period t. It therefore probably ought to be added back into 
disposable income unless one is again to make the assumption that 
disposable income is simply a proxy for labour income, net of income 
taxation. 
viii) PPWt - the private sector equivalent, of NPWt. Owing to 
the diversification of private pension provision the data necessary 
to calculate such a variable is not currently available. In the Diamond 
Report (16) it was suggested that the national balance sheet totals 
of assets of superannuation funds and the pension business of the life 
assurance funds would at least give an overall figure for accrued - 
rights in the form of private pensions. This would not be the case, 
because many schemes in which pensions are fixed in relation to salary 
near retirement are in deficiency as a result of recent rates of 
inflation and many large unfunded schemes would not be included. The 
Diamond Report concluded that the only way the necessary data could 
be collected would be by using sample survey methods-and the Government 
Actuaries Department have agreed to investigate this possibility. Owing 
to this lack of suitable data for the purposes of this investigation 
a proxy variable is to be used. It is hoped that the growth of the 
assets of private and public superannuation funds will reflect the 
growth of accrued rights in private pension funds. In the Diamond_Report 
it was suggQs_t1P_c7 that in 1972 the value of accrued rights was about 
£20,000 million, whilst the value of the assets of superannuation funds 
was £11,447 million. The proxy variable may be a 50% underestimate. 
Ull 
The data for this series comes from Revell and Financial 
Statistics. 
ix) Ut - millions unemployed, excluding school leavers and 
students, in year t (Economic Trends). 
x) BENt - aggregate payments in state retirement pensions in 
year t. If disposable income is to be adjusted to net out pension 
payments-to the retired this is the variable one would have to use. 
Unfortunately for post 1961 it will be an-inaccurate reflection of 
payments in the form of flat rate pension since it will also include 
a small amount reflecting graduated pension payments. - 
xi) CONt - aggregate receipts in the form of flat rate 
national insurance contributions in year t'. This is the sum of 
employer and employee contributions and although one can use relative 
stamp values to determine the aggregate contributions of the employed 
the component of this contribution which can be thought of as a pension 
contribution cannot be separated out. Again, where an-adjustment in 
disposable income is required this will only be an approximation to 
the desired adjustment. 
xii) LPAt - the labour force participation of the aged in ý,, 
period t. This variable reflects retirement trends and is defined as 
the ratio of those in work who are eligible to retire on the basis of 
age to the total population eligible-to retire. 
The data used to calculate the above three series came from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics and the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 
All the variables measured in-money values are in 1971. 
£ millions adjusted for population growth. 
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5.3 CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS INCLUDING STATE PENSION WEALTH 
Of the methods considered in the previous chapter for estimating 
expected income three are going to be considered; the naive hypothesis 
where only current disposable income is included in the estimated 
equation, the empirically justified Feldstein specification with a 
one period lag and the geometrically declining infinite lag. Unless 
otherwise stated all the regressions use annual data for the period 
1949-73 and the estimates are based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
technique. 
i) The naive hypothesis - estimates based on this hypothesis 
using both the gross and net measures of state pension wealth are given 
by equations (1) and (2). As one would expect the marginal propensity 
to consume disposable income is of the order of . 75 - . 80. Net worth 
is an insignificant determinant of consumption as is gross state 
pension worth. The marginal propensity to consume out of net pension 
wealth is significant and negative. The coefficient of determination 
is high, the standard errors are low, being less than 1% the mean value 
of the dependent variable and with du (5%) = 1.66 there is no evidence 
of a serious serial correlation problem. 
ii) The Feldstein specification - estimates based on the use 
of a one period lag in disposable income are given in equations (3) 
and (4). Although the marginal propensity to consume lagged income is 
insignificant the other parameter'estimates and the overall fit of 
the functions are not adversely affected although with du (5%) = 1.77 
equation (3) does show evidence of possible positive serial correlation. 
The standard errors of equations-(3) and-(4) are marginally greater than 
those of equations (1) and (2) respectively and it might therefore be 
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argued that the inclusion of the lagged income variable is unjustifiable. 
iii) The geometrically declining infinite lag - the estimated 
equation here is of the form given by (4.6.3. ), searching for a value 
of A which minimises the sum of squared residuals, given that R2 in 
the maximum region is high and constant. A search was first done using 
values of A between 0 and .9 at .1 intervals. Even using this 
first 
approximation it can be seen from equation (5) that the coefficient 
on gross state pension wealth remains insignificant although its sign 
is different from equations (1) and (3). The analogous equation using 
net pension worth confirmed the results of equations (2) and (4) 
producing a marginal propensity to consume pension wealth of -. 016 
with a standard error of . 008. Note that in both cases the lag 
coefficients are small, indicating a short lag. 
The next stage in the analysis is to search around a finer 
grid of A values in the region of the approximate maximum. This is 
only done using the specification including the significant net pension 
worth variable. Values of A between . 01 and . 19 constitute the search 
region. Before proceeding consider the plot of A against the sum of 
squared residuals given in Figure 5.3.1. It will be noticed that for 
values of A between 0 and .4 the curve is fairly flat, the sum of 
squared residuals not changing a great deal for changes in A. The next 
search is based on the assumption that the best fitting value of A is 
in the region of . 1. The possibility has to be admitted though that 
there could be a local maximum anywhere in the region where A<. 4. 
Fortunately, the uniform shape of the graph and the evidence from 
previous regressions suggest that this is unlikely to be the case. 
From equation (6) a value of A= . 14 minimises the sum of 
squared residuals whilst Figure 5.3.2. tends to confirm that there is 
i; L6 
SSR/1Ö 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
Figure 5.3.1 
0 .l .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 
I; -) 
0 ö C' 
0 
a 
U) Cl) 
rn 
co 
N r1 
M 
N 
N 
M 
r-I 
ýi ý 
r4 w 
ct 0 
Co 0 
N 0 
kD 0 
Ln 0 
I 
unlikely to be a better fitting value of A in the search region. The 
coefficient on net pension worth remains significant, net worth is 
insignificant and there is no evidence of serial correlation. It 
should be noted that as equations (5) and (6) are estimated without 
a lagged dependent variable in the set of independent variables the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is not biassed towards 2. A low value of lag 
coefficient justifies the use of the one period lag on disposable 
income to approximate expected income. 
Having examined the consistency of the three hypotheses 
regarding the specification of expected income three other aspects of 
the analysis can be examined, the appropriateness of the linear speci- 
fications, omitted variables, the definition of the income and net 
worth variables. 
Table 5.3.1. summarises the performance of the linear and 
non linear equations as outlined in the previous chapter. As the 
coefficients of determination are not greatly different it can be 
safely concluded that the performance of the linear specification is 
certainly no worse than the non linear counterparts. The main features 
of the non linear equations are that the constant terms, current 
income and net pension worth, are always significant, lagged income is 
significant in the log-reciprocal specification, net worth is sig- 
nificant with both the semi-logarithmic and log reciprocal specifi- 
cations whilst gross pension worth is always insignificant. 
Two additional variables were also introduced into the 
linear equations. Following Feldstein retained earnings was included 
in the regression and found to be an insignificant determinant of 
consumption. A time trend variable tended to reduce slightly the 
significance of all independent variables but the time trend itself 
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was insignificant. 
It will be remembered that Feldstein and Fane found that 
for the U. K. the marginal propensity to consume net worth'took a 
significant value of about . 017. The above analysis suggests that 
this variable is insignificant. Equations (3) and (4) were re- 
estimated using the Feldstein measure of net worth. Although the 
coefficient on wealth is in both cases increased, to . 006 and . 008 
respectively, they remain insignificant. The only major effect is to 
reduce the coefficient on net pension worth to -. 024 with a standard 
error of . 011. In each case the coefficient of determination is . 002 
lower. It must therefore be concluded that the choice of net worth 
variable is not crucial. 
Lastly consider the modification of equations (3) and (4) 
to exclude pension benefits paid to those currently retired from 
disposable income when using the gross definition of pension worth 
and the additional adding in of current contributions when using the 
net definition. The only impact this has is when using the net 
definition in that the coefficient on net pension worth rises to 
-. 013 whilst its standard error remains unchanged. Disposable income 
appears to be homogenous with respect to its components. Given the 
difficulties involved in using aggregate benefits and contributions 
as defined earlier in this context there is probably little danger in 
continuing with the Blue Book definitions of disposable income. 
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5.4 CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS INCLUDING PRIVATE PENSION WEALTH 
In this section private pension wealth, defined as in section 5.2, 
is introduced into the equations estimated in the previous section. 
The data now refers to the period 1958-73. 
The first estimates, given by equations (7), (8), (9) and 
(10) relate to the introduction of the private pension wealth variable 
into equations (1), (2), (3) and (4). The interesting features of 
these results are the general increase in the magnitude and signifi- 
cance of the net worth and gross state pension wealth variables. The 
net pension wealth variable is smaller and insignificant whilst the 
private pension wealth variable only approaches marginal significance 
in equation (7). A significant negative coefficient on net worth is 
certainly a little surprising since it implies individuals are induced 
to save as a result of accumulating wealth. The case where expected 
income is approximated by an infinite geometric lag is considered in 
equations (11) to (12). The first approximations of the lag coefficients 
are .3 and .2 respectively compared with .2 and .1 in the earlier 
equations (5) and (6). Again the general features of equations (7) to 
(10) are revealed and, for this reason, a more precise value of the 
lag coefficient has not been estimated. The above differences between the 
sbtstof equations can be explained by any one or a combination of three 
things; an omitted variable problem with the equations where private 
pension wealth is excluded, general collinearity between the wealth 
variables which is borne out by the correlation matrix, and a change 
in the relationship between consumption and wealth as between the 
periods 1949-73 and 1958-73. 
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To test for the possibility of a different relationship 
over the shorter period equations (1) to (4) were re-estimated using 
data only for 1958-73. These are the estimated equations (13) to (18). 
It can be seen that the coefficient on the net worth variable remains 
fairly large, negative and significant except in equation (14). Where 
lagged income is omitted gross state pension wealth has a significant 
and positive effect on consumption. The marginal propensity to consume 
net pension worth is of the earlier magnitude but less significant. 
The evidence suggests a greater degree of serial correlation than in 
earlier equations, the critical values of the Durbin-Watson statistic 
being du(5%) = 1.73 for equations (13) and (14) and d (5%) = 1.93 for 
equations (15) and (16). Equations (17) and (18) suggest that these 
results would be supported by the infinite lag model if A were 
estimated to two decimal places. Comparing these with equations (7) to 
(10) shows that the introduction of private pension wealth only has a 
marginal effect, its most significant role being that of raising the 
coefficient on net state pension wealth. Given the insignificance of 
private pension wealth this is exactly what one would expect when 
there is a multicollinearity problem. 
5.5 RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR 
The preceding theoretical analysis has suggested that pension schemes 
may have an impact on savings part of which operates indirectly through 
induced changes in the retirement date. To quantify this effect a 
variable, the labour force participation of the aged, has been included 
in equations (3), (4), (9) and (10). As changes in the retirement date 
are induced the appropriate estimation procedure is two stage least 
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squares with labour force participation endogenous. Although one would 
expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative this is not the 
case in all of the equations, but the coefficient is never significant. 
To learn a little more a series of equations were estimated 
with labour force participation of the aged as the dependent variable. 
The results are given in equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). Examination 
of the labour force participation series reveals that it has remained 
constant at around 13% and this is reflected in the regressions. Apart 
from the constant term only the income level and unemployment seem to 
have any effect. The negative coefficient on unemployment is not at 
all surprising since their labour force participation will reflect the 
degree to which unemployment falls on those over retirement age. As 
for the negative coefficient on income this implies a predominance of 
the income effect of a change in income on the demand for leisure in 
the form of retirement. The size of the coefficient implies that a 1% 
point decrease in the labour force participation of the aged requires 
a doubling of national income. 
5.6 PENSIONS AND PERSONAL SAVINGS 
To determine the impact of pension schemes on personal savings consider 
the following simple model. Savings in any period, t, in the absence of 
a pension arrangement is given by 
St =-a+ (1 - b0)(l_ut) Yt (5.6.1. ) 
where bb is the marginal propensity to consume, ut is the standard rate 
of income tax and Yt is gross income. If it is assumed that the individual 
responds to changes in gross state pension wealth then savings with a 
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pension plan, given that contributions are tax deductable, is given by 
St = -a-i-(1-b0) (1-ut)(Yt ct)-b1SPWt-b2PPWt (5.6.2. ) 
where 'ct is the pension contribution in period t. The effect on 
savings of introducing the plans is given by subtracting (5.6.1. ) from 
(5.6.2. ) which yields 
AS = -(1-bo)(1-ut)Ct biSPW-b2PPW (5.6.3. ) 
The effect of changing pension parameters is given by differentiating 
(5.6.2. ) with respect to the pension parameters 
dS = -(1-b0)(1-u t)dCt 
b1dSPW-b2dPPW (5.6.4. ) 
An analogous calculation assuming that individuals react to changes 
in net state pension worth, remembering that contributions are now 
included in the wealth variable yields 
AS= -b1NPW - b2PPW (5.6.5. ) 
and 
dS = -b1dNPW - b2dPPW (5.6.6. ) 
These results can be used to estimate the quantitative impact of 
pension schemes on personal savings. 
Consider firstly the relationship between state pension and 
savings over the period 1949-73. From (1), (3) and (5) the coefficient 
on gross state pension wealth is insignificant - savings will only 
therefore be affected as a result of the reduction in disposable 
income attributable to pension contributions. The three estimated 
equations imply marginal propensities to consume disposable income of 
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. 759, . 764, and . 819 - estimates will be based on an assumed value of 
. 775. The rate of tax used is the standard rate of income tax whilst 
individual contributions are the employee's share of aggregate 
contributions to the National Insurance Fund, the relative shares 
being based on stamp values. Although this will clearly be an over- 
estimate of pension contributions this is to be used in the analysis 
to follow. Data relating to aggregate contributions and the components 
of the National Insurance stamp are published in Social Security 
Statistics. 
Using the gross definition of state pension wealth the impact of 
the existence of the state pension scheme on personal savings is given 
in Column 1 of Table 5.6.1. It is clear that the overall effect is to 
reduce savings but when the magnitude of the change is compared with 
the figures in Column 5 of the table, which are aggregate contributions 
to the National Insurance Fund, it can be seen that the substitution is 
far from perfect. Total savings, including pension savings, clearly 
increases but as a large proportion of this is paid to the Government, 
and is thus passed on in the form of concurrent benefits, it cannot in 
general be assumed that the rate of capital accumulation will be 
higher. 
When the net definition of social security wealth is used only the 
marginal propensity to consume out of this form of wealth has to be 
considered. The savings changes in Column 2 of Table 5.6.1 are based on 
the value of . 015 given by equation (6). When compared with actual 
savings, given in column 4, it can be seen that, for most of the period, 
saving would have been 30-35% lower in the absence of the state pension 
scheme but that the degree of complementarity has been increasing over time. 
The effect of changing pension parameters can be analysed by 
considering the effect on savings of a 10% increase in pension benefits 
and contributions. 
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Table 5.6.1 
The Effect of State Pensions on Personal Savings: 1949-73 (Current £ millions) 
1* 2 3 4 5 
1949 (-) 34.15 154.97 78 409 
1950 34.32 155.44 -64 411 
1951 35.45 219.48 154 426 
1952 28.89 222.46 376 455 
1953 31.18 242.65 455 491 
1954 31.76 246.01 382 500 
1955 38.46 249.60 484 582 
1956 39.72 250.35 756 601 
1957 39.79 251.10 728 601 
1958 46.25 284.91 (-) 1005.23 642 709 
1959 50.38 300.72 1008.23 803 724 
1960 50.93 301.66 1011.28 1297 729 
1961 54.10 447.76 1165.89 1690 784 
1962 54.24 507.55 1169.39 1515 786 
1963 61.76 528.09 1379.84 1626 895 
1964 64.87 538.08 1384.00 1864 940 
1965 74.45 566.07 1652.58 2184 1196 
1966 73.32 600.85 1657.53 2384 1191 
1967 78.98 559.02 1867.97 2340 1271 
1968 90.29 623.11 1873.57 2337 1427 
1969 91.02 610.90 2088.00 2609 1449 
1970 93.83 603.87 2094.12 3150 1494 
1971 98.71 900.99 2530.76 3416 1515 
1972 96.35 904.56 2540.77 4435 1567 
1973 105.77 1440.521 3183.93 5727 1720 
* These estimates are based on the assumption (p. 138) that pension 
contributions are tax deductable - this has not been the case for the 
latter part of the data period. Nevertheless, the changing of this 
assumption will not affect the implications of these results. 
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Using the gross definition of pension wealth the lack of 
significance of this variable implies that a 10% increase in benefits 
will have no effect on savings. Evaluated in 1971 a 10% increase in 
contributions (which would be from 67.2p to 73.9p per week) would 
depress savings by £4.3 millions or . 13% but bring in for the Govern- 
ment £31.5 millions. 
Using the net definition of social security wealth it will 
be assumed that a 10% change in benefits will increase gross state 
pension wealth by 10% whilst a 10% increase in: contributions will 
increase the difference between the gross and net definitions, i. e., 
the present value of anticipated liabilities, by 10%. A 10% increase 
in benefits (which would be from £9.70 to £10.87 per married couple) 
would cost the Government £182 millions but would bring about an 
increase in savings of £210.9 millions or 6.2%. If contributions were 
increased by 10% this would depress savings by £120.8 millions or 3.5%. 
It will be remembered from Chapter 2 that in the context of 
the model described it was found that both increases in state pension 
benefits and contributions led to a reduction in work period and 
therefore aggregare savings. As regards the increase in benefits this 
is not supported by the evidence - gross state pension wealth has no 
effect on savings whilst changes in net state pension wealth work in 
the opposite direction. As regards the increasing of contributions the 
theoretical findings are supported although the magnitude of the 
effect is vastly different as between definitions. 
Although Feldstein felt his results were successful, in that 
theyYdemönsträtedlthättusingJeitherrdeffsii£ionroffsocial-security 
wealth, givenathate, hbychAdethaTsamegsign; khhdasimilirrimplications 
for the effect of the existence of a scheme on aggregate savings, this 
I'fz 
does not mean that the above results cannot be viewed as at least 
being moderately successful. Indeed the one thing they do show is 
the important role played by pension contributions. This is seen in 
that it is only when these:. are included in the pension wealth variable 
that it becomes significant and it is only changes in contributions 
which have a consistent effect on savings. 
For the shorter period 1958-73 where private pension worth 
was introduced the empirical results were not particularly encouraging. 
Not only was private pension worth generally insignificant, but also the 
significance of net state pension worth fell although this could be 
attributed to collinearity between the pension wealth variables. One 
feature of the results which is interesting is the increase in sig- 
nificance of the gross state pension wealth variable. In the one case 
where it is clearly significant, equation (13), the value of the marginal 
propensity to consume is . 018. The saving changes in Column 3 of Table 
5.6.1. are based on this figure and to these have to be added the 
reduction in savings due to the reduction in disposable income 
attributed to contributions. With a marginal propensity to consume 
disposable income of . 818 the value of this will be about 95% of the 
figure in Column 1. Although the total reduction in savings is clearly 
very large these figures have to be treated with extreme caution in 
that they are based Qni9nly 15 observations, there is only a single 
case when the coefficient on gross state pension wealth is significant 
and the equation with which this is the case is the simplest form of 
consumption function estimated, though not necessarily the worst fitting. 
Changes in contributions and benefits will have the following impact. 
A 10% increase in pension contributions would have an impact almost 
the same as that in the previous section. A 10% increase in pension 
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benefits, which costs the Government £182 millions, will further 
reduce personal savings by £262.9 millions or 7.7%. 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS. 
The results of this regression analysis are rather disappointing in 
that the relationship between pensions and savings is not particularly 
significant. Nevertheless one might take solace in the fact that for 
the two data periods considered the parameter estimates, using 
differing specifications of the consumption function, exhibit no 
evidence of instability, although this is not the case when comparing 
the whole period with a sample thereof. 
The., major findings may be summarised as follows: 
i) A non linear specification of the consumption function 
appears to be in no way superior to a linear alternative. 
ii) Three specifications of expected income have been used 
and no one appears to be preferable to the other two. The use of a 
short lag on current income to approximate expected income is shown to 
be appropriate. 
iii) For the period 1949-73 the consumption function estimates 
reveal that net worth in general and gross state pension worth are 
insignificant determinants of consumption whilst net state pension 
worth has a significant depressing effect -n consumption with a co- 
efficient of around -. 015. This is thought to reflect the importance of 
pension contributions as a determinant of consumer behaviour. 
The inclusion of the additional variables retained earnings 
of companies, a time trend and a retirement variable along with the 
redefinition of the net worth and income variables has no significant 
impact on these results. 
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iv) For the period 1958-73 the market value of the assets of 
superannuation funds, used as a proxy for private pension wealth, was 
introduced into the consumption function. This results in net worth 
becoming significant with a negative coefficient, the degree of 
significance of gross state pension worth increasing (its only sig- 
nificant value was +. 018) whilst the significance of net state pension 
worth is reduced. Private pension worth appears to be insignificant 
and the above results reoccurred with it omitted from the estimated 
equations. 
v) The regressions with labour force participation of the 
aged as the dependent variable imply that there has been no induced 
retirement, or at least none that can be explained by pension changes. 
vi) The effect that the existence of a pension scheme has on 
personal savings is determined by the specification of the pension 
wealth variables. Using the net definition for the longer period the 
evidence suggests that in the absence of a state pension scheme 
personal savings would have been 30-: 35% lower. As the gross definition 
is insignificant savings is only affected due to the reduction in 
disposable income brought about by the pension contributions. In recent 
years the impact of this has been small relative to the level of 
personal savings. For the shorter period the significant positive 
value of the coefficient on gross state pension worth implies that 
personal savings has been between 50-100% lower than it would otherwise 
have been. 
vii) For the longer periods using the gross definition of 
social security wealth, a 10% increase in pension benefits, in 1971, 
has no impact on savings whilst for the shorter period it reduces 
savings by £262.9 millions. Such a change would cost the Government 
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£182 millions. A 10% increase in contributions would bring in £31.5 
millions for the Government and depress savings by £4.3 millions. 
Using the net definition of social security wealth over the longer 
period the benefit increase implies an increase in savings of £210.9 
millions whilst the contribution increase would depress savings by 
£120.8 millions. 
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APPENDIX I 
A TIME SERIES OF ANTICIPATED STATE PENSION WEALTH IN THE U. K. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Diamond Report contained a Government Actuaries Department 
estimate that the value of accrued rights in the form of state 
pensions, excluding the graduated scheme, in 1975 was £145,111 
millions. A series for 1963-7 has also been estimated by Atkinson 
(8) but as the purpose of this calculation was to adjust wealth 
distributions to include pension wealth no aggregate figures were 
produced. Both calculations were based on the assumption that the 
accrued right which was a proportion of the individual's total right, 
the proportion being given by the ratio of the present values of 
contributions to date and total contributions. Assumptions also had 
to be made about the growth rates of benefits and contributions to 
calculate the present values of lifetime benefits and contributions, 
which were weighted by survival probabilities. 
Feldstein (19) observed that over his data period pension 
receipts varied over time with the per capita disposable income of a 
particular class of worker around a mean value of . 41. To arrive at a 
value of gross pension wealth Feldstein made projections of the dis- 
counted present value of disposable income, weighted by survival 
probabilities, for all classes of workers and multiplied this figure 
by . 41. Pensions are 
financed by a proportional tax on disposable 
income which it is assumed will remain constant. The present value of 
liabilities are then estimated as above. Net pension wealth is the 
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difference between these two figures. 
The aim of this Appendix is to describe a method of 
producing a time series of pension wealth for the U. K. The method 
used will be similar to Feldstein's in that gross and net pension 
wealth will both be estimated whilst it is much closer to Atkinson's 
and the Government Actuaries' in that it is to be based on actual 
values of pension benefits and contributions through time. 
2. ASSUMPTIONS 
A. A. 1. ) All persons who for any part of their working lives are 
unemployed pay national insurance contributions during this period 
and maintain full pension rights. 
A. A. 2. ) On retirement married women have no pension rights whilst 
single women have full pension rights. 
A. A. 3. ` There is no divorce or remarriage. 
A. A. 4. ) Pensioners anticipate no change in marital status. 
(A. A. 5. ) Of all the men who retire the proportion k will be married - 
the proportion k of all men not retired will be allocated the married 
couples pension. Of all the women who retire the proportion k* will be 
married - the proportion (1-k*) of all women not retired will be 
allocated no pension. 
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3. THE ALGORITHM 
For a single person aged a at time t, who anticipates no change in 
status, the value of the state pension on retirement is given by 
PR (a,. t) = pt (1 + g) 
R-a (A. 3.1. ) 
where p is the annual pension of a single person, R is the retirement 
age and g is the annual rate of growth of p. At age R the expected 
value of total pension receipts will be given by 
L 
E (R(n)/k(R))pR(l+g/l+d)n-R 
n=R 
(A. 3.2. ) 
where L is the maximum length of life, L(x) is the proportion of 
persons born who survive to age x and d is the rate of discount. At 
age a the pension promise has the value 
L 
(L(R)/L(a)) (1+d) a-R E X(n)/Z(R) % (l+g/l+d) 
n-R (A. 3.3. ) 
n=R 
Substituting (A. 3.1. ) into (A. 3.3. ) yields 
L 
(R)IL(a)) (1+d)a-E (k(n)/Y. (R))pt(1+g)R-a (1+g/l+d) n-R 
n=R 
which for computational simplicity can be written 
L 
(pt/1C(a)) (l+g/l+d)R-a E R(n) (l+g/l+d)n-R (A. 3.4. ) 
n--R 
This is the anticipated state pension wealth of a person aged a at 
time t. A similar calculation is done for single women and married 
couples substituting in the different pension values and making 
proportional adjustments to allow for changes in status. For existing 
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pensioners anticipated pension wealth is simply 
L 
(pt /I (a) )t (n) (, +g/ 1+d) 
n-a (A. 3.5. ) 
n=a 
Once these calculations have been completed for all ages within each 
pension group and multiplied by the working and retired population 
figures one has a figure for aggregate anticipated state pension 
wealth which has been denoted SPW. 
An individual's liability is the discounted present value 
of outstanding contributions. For a single man this is given by 
(R-1) 
(ct/L (a)) ER (n) (1+g/1+d) n-a 
n=a 
(A. 3.6. ) 
where ct is the annual contribution of a single man and g its rate 
of growth. Again this can be applied to all pension groups and all 
ages. Adjustments for change in status are made in a similar manner 
to those just outlined. This involves assuming that women who retire 
married have made no contributions which is clearly unrealistic. 
If these figures are aggregated and subtracted from gross 
state pension wealth one arrives at a value for net pension wealth 
which has been denoted NPW. 
4. THE DATA 
The data relates to the period 1948-73 inclusive. The values of 
state pension benefits and contributions during the period are 
published in Social Security Statistics. Contributions are the 
National Insurance contributions and not the proportion that can 
be viewed solely as a pension contribution - the aggregate value 
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for liabilities might therefore be an overestimate. 
The rate of growth of benefits is the constant annual 
rate at which benefits have grown over the period and this same 
growth rate is applied to contributions. It is assumed that indi- 
viduals discount future receipts at the average rate of interest 
on 2ý% Consols the data for this coming from Paish () and 
Financial Statistics: The average rate of growth has been approxi- 
mately 6.5% per annum whilst the average rate of interest has been 
approximately 5.5%. From equations (1) (6) it can be seen that these 
two rates always appear in the form (l+g/l+d) implying a net rate 
of discount of 1.01. 
The retirement age, R, is the earliest date at which the 
individual is eligible to receive the state pension - that is 65 
for men and 60 for women. Only the wealth of those over 25 is 
considered and the maximum length of lifetime, 
L, is assumed to 
be 99, the upper limit of accurate values of £(x). 
For intervals of five years values of £(x) are available 
from the Annual Abstract of Statistics. Using the results reported 
by the Faculty of Actuaries () it can be shown that the survival 
probability function is smooth within these intervals and values 
of L(x) within the intervals can safely be interpolated. 
Data relating to the population structure and marital 
structure is contained in the Annual Abstract of Statistics, the 
ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics and Social Security Statistics. 
The marital status of those who retire in any year is only available 
for a short period in the late 6O's and early 70's - the average 
for those years was applied to the whole data period. 
151 
5. RESULTS 
The estimated values of SPW and NPW are presented in Table A. 5.1. 
6. COMMENT 
An important point to notice about these estimates is their magnitude. 
This is clearly seen if the net pension worth series is compared with 
the net worth series in Table A. 5.1. For example, in 1971 the value of 
net worth was £114,982 millions - in the same year net pension worth 
was £60,006 millions or more than half the value of net worth in general. 
Also, although Feldstein emphasises that calculations of this sort 
are not actuarially accurate an estimate of net pension worth in 1975, 
based on this series compares well with the Government Actuaries' 
calculation reported earlier given that from 1973 to 1975 the basic 
state pension rose 33%. 
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Table A. 5.1 
Aggregate Values of Gross and Net State Pension Wealth, and Net 
Worth: 1948-73 (Current E. millions) 
SPW NPW NW 
1948 28110 11202 29053 
1949 28195 10331 29755 
1950 28280 10363 29164 
1951 32602 14632 32129 
1952 35559 14831 33401 
1953 35650 16177 29192 
1954 35757 16401 32224 
1955 44278 16640 31397 
1956 44411 16690 33019 
1957 44544 16740 35775 
1958 55846 18994 40274 
1959 56013 20048 46164 
1960 56182 20111 52650 
1961 64771 29851 55959 
1962 64966 33837 59553 
1963 76658 35206. 64988 
1964 76889 35872 73243 
1965 91810 39938 76776 
1966 92085 40057 78343 
1967 103776 37268 85351 
1968 104087 41541 89727 
1969 116000 40727 93263 
-1970 116348 40258 ' 98779 
1971 140598 60066 114982 
1972 141154 60304 141156 
1973 176885 96035 167149 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate the relationship between 
state and private pensions and personal savings. A theoretical frame- 
work has been developed to facilitate the a priori determination of the 
relationship and an empirical investigation then undertaken using data 
for the U. K. in the postwar period. These two aspects of the thesis 
will firstly be summarised. 
Initially, the standard life cycle model of individual 
accumulation is extended to include a flat rate pension scheme. The 
introduction of the scheme will have an impact on savings determined 
by a savings replacement effect, where pension saving is substituted 
for alternative forms personal saving, and an induced retirement effect, 
where savings is increased to finance a longer retirement period. The 
net effect on savings will depend on the rate of return to pension 
contributions, and therefore lifetime income, implied by the combination 
of the two effects. As membership of state pension schemes is usually 
compulsory there exists the possibility that the implied rate of return 
can be above or below the market rate, indeed it may even be negative, 
with the result that lifetime income may be higher or lower than prior 
to the introduction of the pension scheme. The impact on savings 
cannot therefore be determined at a theoretical level. Increasing 
pension contributions and benefits always lead to a reduction in work 
period and, under the usual assumptions, aggregate savings. These 
changes also induce early retirement. 
1.54 
Having analysed the state pension case the model is further 
modified to include private pension schemes, in particular a terminal 
salary scheme, membership of which is assumed to be compulsory, and a 
money purchase scheme, the joining of which is a voluntary decision. 
Again, for the reasons outlined above, the effect on personal savings 
of introducing the private schemes cannot be determined a priori. It 
is still possible though to say something about the effect of changes 
in pension contributions and benefits. When considering the 
increasing of pension contributions and state pension benefits, the 
outcomes are as in the state pension case alone. If attention is 
confined to increasing private pension benefit functions by constant 
absolute amounts then early retirement and a reduction in work period 
savings are the unambiguous outcomes. In the case of the money 
purchase scheme early retirement also implies a larger private 
pension fund. 
The empirical estimation of the relationship has been attempted 
through the inclusion of pension wealth variables in the aggregate 
life cycle consumption function. Two definitions of pension wealth 
were used. Gross pension wealth has been defined as the discounted 
present value of future pension receipts weighted by survival 
probabilities whilst net pension wealth is gross pension wealth less 
the discounted present value of future pension contributions weighted 
by survival probabilities (termed liabilities). Unfortunately these 
definitions could only be used with state pensions - data was not , 
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available to evaluate these types of wealth variable in the case of 
private pensions. Over the period 1949-73 gross state pension wealth 
appears to have no impact on consumption, and therefore savings, whilst 
net pension wealth depresses consumption. The growth of the market 
value of the assets of superannuation- funds was used as a proxy for the 
growth of private pension wealth. This data was available for the 
period 1958-73. Whilst private pension wealth was found to be 
insignificant in the regressions in these same equations gross state 
pension wealth becomes significant and positive. If net pension wealth 
is substituted for the gross alternative its coefficient remains 
negative but its significance falls. Over both periods there was found 
to be no evidence of an induced retirement effect. Various estimates 
of the effect of the existence of pension schemes and changes in pension 
contributions and benefits were made on the basis of a range of 
estimated coefficients. As one would expect these estimates varied 
widely given the different signs of the coefficients on gross and net 
state pension wealth. 
There are four aspects of the work that, at the end of the day, 
give cause for concern. The two relating to the theoretical work are 
probably less serious than the two relating to the empirical work. 
In the development of the theoretical analysis the individuals 
work/leisure decision was given only passing consideration. Indeed it 
was only shown that if the individual moved continuously from the work 
to the retirement period then leisure considerations would be 
irrelevant. Nevertheless recognition was accorded to the possibility 
that if this move is discontinuous, which is highly likely to be the 
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case, not only might the optimal retirement date be different to that 
derived in the basic model but also the earlier comparative statics 
results might no longer apply. In a recent paper Ulph (58) has begun 
to consider this problem in a model incorporating a terminal salary 
based private pension scheme. Employing an iso-elastic utility function 
in consumption and leisure he shows that certain assumptions relating to 
the parameters of the utility function imply that not all the comparative 
statics results of earlier chapters necessarily go through. Thus leisure 
considerations are not irrelevant to the analysis of pensions. The 
results also imply that analyses of the individuals life cycle problem 
which do not include pensions, and where the individual retires when the 
marginal utility of consumption falls below the marginal utility derived 
from spending all ones time in leisure, might be substantially changed 
when leisure considerations are taken into account. An obvious,.. 
extension of pension theory would then be to integrate it into. a model 
of the above type, such as that of Blinder (13). 
Another important feature of the pension decision,, which again 
has only been covered rather briefly, is uncertainty about the length 
of lifetime. It has been shown that if it is assumed that there exists 
a perfect insurance market then the problem reduces to an analysis under 
certainty, the insurance asset obviating any problem arising from a 
probabilistic date of death. Ulph and Hemming (59) have since dropped 
this last assumption and shown how the results of this thesis are 
affected. Although this turns out to be to an extent: that gives 
little cause for concern, the new model does produce the results within 
a framework that is.. more realistic. The above paper also has important 
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implications for another aspect of pension analysis. When lifetime is 
uncertain the purchase of a pension asset or annuity provides insurance 
and the individual should therefore be prepared to purchase it even if 
its return were less than actuarially fair. Now in evaluating the 
value of anticipated state pension wealth the average market rate of 
interest has been used to discount the expected value of future returns. 
This is an approximation of the actuarially fair rate of interest. But 
under uncertainty this is not the appropriate rate of discount - what 
ought to be used is the lowest rate of return at which the individual 
is just willing to purchase the annuity. In fact Ulph and Hemming 
show that whilst the individual is holding non-pension assets the 
appropriate rate of discount is the rate on those assets. Once the 
individual has run down his stock of these assets the appropriate rate 
of discount will be the subjective rate of discount incorporating a 
risk factor. Thus if the individual is holding the alternative asset 
the appropriate rate of discount is less than the actuarially fair rate, 
(see (3.6.4)). Pension wealth will therefore be underestimated. When 
none of the alternative assets are held the value of pension wealth can 
be under- or over-estimated depending on the relative magnitudes of the 
rates of interest and the subjective rate of discount. Not only do 
these results suggest that pension wealth might be evaluated 
incorrectly but it could be that the optimal bequest decision, which did 
not affect the earlier analysis, now becomes important in that 
individuals will be holding capital through the later part of their life. 
When they choose to make their bequest will affect their valuation of 
pension wealth. This interrelationship could produce some interesting 
results and is worth exploring- further. 
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Turning now to the problems arising on the estimation side 
one can consider firstly the general insignificance of the pension 
variables in the regression equations and the inconsistency of the 
short and long period estimates. In retrospect, it should have been 
realised that the wealth approach could present a problem in attempting 
to reconcile the theoretical and empirical results. Recall that 
increases in both state pension contributions and benefits always lead 
to a reduction in savings - when using the net state pension wealth 
variable in the estimated equations, no matter what the sign of its 
coefficient, both the above predictions cannot be confirmed 
simultaneously. This follows since increasing contributions and benefits 
respectively decreases and increases net state pension wealth. Only 
if the coefficient on gross state pension wealth had been positive and 
significant could both predictions have been borne out, That net state 
pension wealth alone should turn out to be significant, and then 
negative, implies that only the effect on savings of increasing 
contributions is confirmed. Possibly this result was to have been 
expected since the only acceptable way of explaining the difference 
between the coefficients on the two pension wealth variables is through 
the significance of liabilities. Unfortunately there appears to be no 
reasonable argument which explains why individual behaviour should be 
determined by liabilities rather than gross wealth. 
One has to be rather surprised about the apparent change in 
the relationship between the long and short data periods. A somewhat 
similar case of this arose when Feldstein (19) changed his data 
period. Since in both analyses the regressors: are all income and 
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wealth variables it is difficult to believe that this is not a classic 
symptom of the multicollinearity which is quite clearly present rather 
than some structural change in the relationship over time. 
In the theoretical developments an induced retirement effect 
played a prominent part in the discussion. When it came to estimation 
the effect was found to be non-existent. Indeed the data suggested 
that retirement patterns had not changed markedly over the postwar 
period. This is not surprising. Under the state pension scheme 
coverage was universal by 1946 and whilst subsequent changes in 
contributions and benefits have hardly had marginal effects on lifetime 
income it is unlikely that this will be affected by induced retirement 
because either many people will retire at the official retirement date 
or, for those retiring later, the retirement date is not a continuous 
variable. Even if this were not the case in practice estimation of 
the effect would be difficult since the retirement date is discrete as 
far as official statistics are concerned. As far as private pensions 
are concerned significant growth has taken place over the postwar 
period but still only half the working population are covered - many 
of these are younger workers whose retirement behaviour will not yet 
have been observed. 
Indeed this last point is one that applies to the study of 
private pensions as a whole. The empirical analysis of relationships 
involving private pensions has been scant and highly unsatisfactory. 
That no attempt was made to calculate a private pension wealth variable 
was simply due to data inadequacy: that no attempt was made to collect 
the data is explained by comparative advantage. As mentioned earlier 
1 (o 
the Government Actuaries Department are currently engaged in providing 
estimates. When these are available and the regression equations 
re-estimated some more useful results may emerge. 
Even when the specification and data problems are overcome 
there still might exist one reason why the results produced might not 
be convincing. When a life cycle model of individual behaviour has 
carefully been built up, and no one could disagree that when considering 
pension problems this is the appropriate type of model, it will always 
be disappointing that the model cannot truly be tested with the data 
currently available. All the methods considered for estimating such a 
model are only approximations - there can be no substitute for cross- 
section data relating to the behaviour of the same individuals over 
fairly long periods of time. 
Whilst this pessimism about the reliability of the results is 
clearly very healthy one is now only left to ponder whether the 
attitude would have been the same if the estimated coefficients had 
all been statistically significant and of the theoretically anticipated 
signs. One has to hope so! 
II 
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